Macalester College

DigitalCommons@Macalester College
Political Science Honors Projects

Political Science Department

Spring 4-28-2015

Escaping Thucydides' Trap: Change, Conflict, and
the Future of the American-led Order
Elijah Wohl
Macalester College, ewohl@macalester.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors
Part of the International Relations Commons
Recommended Citation
Wohl, Elijah, "Escaping Thucydides' Trap: Change, Conflict, and the Future of the American-led Order" (2015). Political Science
Honors Projects. Paper 50.
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/50

This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

Escaping Thucydides’ Trap: Change, Conflict,
and the Future of the American-led Order

Elijah Wohl
Advised By Dr. David Blaney
Political Science Department
Published 28 April 2015

Abstract

For centuries the discourse surrounding change in the international system has revolved
around Thucydides’ thesis that change and conflict are synonymous as great powers rise
and fall. This argument has regularly provided a historical model for major change in the
international system. It remains pertinent today as the rise of new great powers –
particularly Brazil, India, and China – have fundamentally altered the balance of power in
the international system. This has resulted in an international order increasingly
susceptible to pressures for change across economic, political, and structural spectrums.
In this study I argue that as power shifts from Europe to Asia and Latin America over the
coming decades change is inevitable, but violent conflict is not. I outline how the United
States can reduce the potential for conflict by responding to the changing international
structure, accepting incremental change that does not go against the fundamental
character of the current order while avoiding a buildup of pressure that could lead to
systemic conflict. I measure how effective the American response to international change
has been over the past two decades, and where appropriate suggest where the United
States could modify its approach to avoid falling into the historical Thucydides’ trap.
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I Introduction
What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear that this
inspired in Sparta ~ Thucydides on the Cause of the Peloponnesian War1
International orders do not last forever. Throughout history, rulers have struggled to
cultivate amity and contain enmity between different political communities…yet each of
the aforementioned orders eventually proved finite. ~ Andrew Phillips on War, Religion
and Empire2
In the town of Kodari on the border between Chinese occupied Tibet and Nepal
there is a small secondary school named Shree Kodari.3 The only public school within a
four-hour walk of the town, until 2012 it offered classes only through grade six. That
changed in 2012, when a donation from the Chinese ambassador to Nepal facilitated the
construction of a third story to the Shree Kodari School and an expansion of its
curriculum to include Chinese language instruction as well as regular classes through
twelfth grade. That initial donation, along with the continued support of the Nepal China
Himalaya Friendship Society, has given students near the border a tremendous advantage
in finding jobs in what remains one of the most impoverished states in the world. It has
also sparked some anger among the locals, who believe that the Chinese wield an
oversized influence in Nepal.
Though Nepal stands at the crossroads of India and China, for centuries it has
been within India’s sphere of influence, sharing the same religions, written script, and a
tied currency. Over the last few years China has been challenging this relationship, and
1

Thucydides, Book 1, 1.23-[6].
Phillips: 2011, 1.
3
All research for this section was undertaken in September 2013 as part of a project for the
School of International Training. Information was gathered from interviews with locals translated
by Pema lhamo.
2

1

today Chinese hydroelectric plants power Nepal’s towns and villages, Chinese roads link
Lhasa to Kathmandu, and travel occurs with increased frequency, and Chinese built
schools teach Chinese to Nepalese children who hope to one-day travel to find work in
China.4 All but invisible outside of Nepal itself, the struggle is easy to pass-off as a minor
competition for influence in a small country with no real strategic or economic value.
I argue that, to the contrary, the Shree Kodari school – and the larger competition
it is a small part of – are indicative of significant change occurring at many levels across
the entirety of the international system. Economic shifts have allowed India, China, and
Brazil to step onto the world stage as rising great powers, able to articulate independent
national interests within often conflicting views of how the international system should
be structured in the coming decades. This economic shift is already spilling over into
other spheres, translating into calls for structural changes in the international order and
shifts in regional military balances of power around the world.
The current international system was largely shaped by the United States in the
aftermath of the Second World War, and the norms and institutions that were put into
place continue to have a profound impact on how states interact with one another. This
international system has proved resilient to change thus far, surviving the ideological
struggles of the Cold War and resulting in one of the longest recorded periods of great
power peace in history, but it has always been premised on the ability of the United
States to prevent major challenges to the status quo and overcome minor ones.5 This
ability has been seriously eroded over the past few decades. The economic rise of Brazil,
China, and India, the revitalization of Russia, and the continuous drain on United States
4
5

Bhaskar: 2010
Levy: 1983, 88-91.
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resources from instability in North Africa and the Middle East all constrain the ability of
the United States to maintain the stability of the international system. The result is an
international system that is moving towards disequilibrium, a period in which change at
all levels of power across all the world’s regions is possible.
Change can be beneficial to systems and societies; the alternative is stagnation, a
seemingly inevitable slowdown in economic growth, social mobility, technological
innovation, and exploration.6 The same is true of international systems, and the rise of
new great powers is an opportunity to right some of the historical wrongs that have been
perpetuated by the current system, such as the disparity in standard of living between the
global north and global south. Yet change is also an inherently difficult and dangerous
process, particularly when applied to the entirety of the world’s international order. As
states’ relative power shifts the potentials for miscommunications and confrontation
increase dramatically, and historically major change to the international system has been
accompanied by horrific wars that have devastated the states that took part in them.7
It was change and its resulting uncertainty that Thucydides blamed for the
Peloponnesian War that ended the Greek golden age at the end of the 5th century BC.
According to his interpretation, the rise of Athenian power relative to Sparta made

6

History is full of examples of stagnated societies. Consider that in 1500 an objective observer
would have predicted from relative levels of economic wealth, military power, and technological
innovation that the Ottoman Turks, Ming Chinese, or Mogul Indians would come to prominence
instead of the Europeans. Instead, a deeply fractured and competitive Europe was forced to
innovate and change, and as a result grew at a rapid rate while China, India, and the Ottoman
Empire – without significant internal or external motivation to change – stagnated for centuries
until they were eventually overcome by European colonizers who had surpassed them by nearly
all traditional indices of national power. See Kennedy: 1987, 3-30.
7
The most recent example of a war accompanying a major change within the international system
resulted in approximately 80 million fatalities, destroyed most of Europe, North Africa, and East
Asia, and ended only after two nuclear weapons were used on major population centers.
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conflict between the two increasingly likely, as Sparta interpreted the rise of Athens as an
existential threat.8 This explanation for international conflict has remained popular to this
day, and modern scholars such as Kennedy, Gilpin, Amitav, and Ferguson have applied
Thucydides’ argument to suggest that the relative decline of the United States will
inevitably lead to conflict with one or more rising states. Kennedy and Gilpin in
particular argue that changing economic power inevitably leads to changing distributions
of military power, and that this shift in turn leads to the decline of the reigning power,
conflict leading to the demise of the system it created, and the creation of a new
international system led by the victorious power or powers.9
In this study I argue against the inevitability of this scenario. Change is inevitable,
and the shifts that have occurred to the relative distributions of power throughout the
international system are undeniable and unlikely to reverse themselves. Despite this, I
believe that the United States has the capacity to continue leading the international
system well into the foreseeable future, and that this continued leadership does not need
to come at the price of direct military confrontation with the rising powers. If the United
States proves willing and able to accommodate the rise of new great powers, if the rising
powers do not misinterpret the magnitude of America’s relative decline or come into
conflict with each other, and if all the involved states avoid serious misunderstandings or
miscommunications, then I argue that the rising powers – China, India, and Brazil – can
be accommodated within the bounds of the existing international system without
resorting to the traditional instability and violence that has accompanied previous rising
powers.
8
9

Thucydides, Book 1, 1.23.
Kennedy: 1987, 536-540 and Gilpin: 1981, 231-244.
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In section two I examine existing theories about the nature of change in the
international system and explore some of the existing works from the “declinist
literature” on the future of American power. I then focus on the four rising great powers
of India, Brazil, China, and Russia in section three, discuss how each has the potential to
affect the international system, and explore some of the challenges that they must
overcome before becoming genuine great powers. In my fourth section I widen my scope
to analyze how the rise of these powers will constrain American action abroad and act as
catalysts for change in four critical regions around the world – the Western Hemisphere,
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and Africa. Finally, in section five I discuss the steps
the United States has taken to respond to these changes so far such as the proposed TPP
and TTIP trade initiatives and the purported pivot to Asia. Where appropriate, I outline
changes the United States could enact to better to preserve the stability of the
international system by accepting incremental reform while maintaining the existing
norms and institutions.
Fifty years ago Kodari was a tiny village almost entirely dependent on subsistence
farming for its income. Today it has almost quadrupled in size due to the growing
commerce between Nepal and China. Its citizens make a living selling Coca-Cola
alongside local sweets to the endless stream of truck drivers passing between the two
nations, and they go home to watch Hollywood and Bollywood films on TVs powered by
Chinese electric dams. This is the face of the coming world, a space in which no single
power dominates any metric of power. If the existing and rising great powers can adapt to
this changing environment, than the world has the potential to benefit from the
innovations that enhanced competition and cooperation will bring. If they cannot, than
5

the alternative may be a 21st century every bit as bloody as the one preceding it.
Mitigating this risk, and ensuring that change and conflict are no longer synonymous,
must be the primary goal of the world’s states in the decades to come.

6

II Theorizing Decline
Introduction
Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of Great Powers fundamentally altered the
debate over the nature of change in the international system. In it, he analyzes the last
five hundred years of great power relations. Kennedy’s primary thesis is that the rise and
fall of great powers in the international system directly correlates to their ever-changing
relative economic power.10 Furthermore, he argues that established great powers have a
tendency to over-extend themselves (what he terms “imperial overstretch”) by spending
too large a proportion of their GDP on maintaining the status quo, retarding investment in
more productive ventures.11 The result is that established great powers are overtaken by
newer, faster developing states, which eventually convert their economic gains to military
power. Once the perceived power of the revisionist state(s) equals the perceived power of
the established one(s), the result has historically been hegemonic war and profound
instability within the international system.12
Kennedy applies this theory of the rise and fall of great powers to the position of
the United States at the beginning of the 1980s. Kennedy argues that the United States
faces the same challenges to its supremacy that previous great powers have, despite
modern developments such as the United Nations, the interconnectedness of the global
political economy, and the advent of nuclear weapons.13 Kennedy’s conclusion is that the
United States is in a state of decline that will only grow worse in the coming decades as a
10

Kennedy: 1987, xv-xvi.
Ibid., 515.
12
Ibid., xxiii-xxiv.
13
Ibid., 538.
11
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result of the age-old processes of imperial overstretch and the challenges posed by new
powers such as Japan and China.14
Kennedy’s work had important implications for the existing scholarly debate over
the nature and extent of American decline and its implications for the international
system. This debate has continued into the present, and political scientists continue to
publish articles and books about whether the United States is, in fact, in an irreversible
state of decline.15
This intellectual fervor has developed despite the fact that recent events have
disproved many of Kennedy’s predictions about the end of the 20th century. On the basis
of his theory, Kennedy predicted the rise of Japan’s power to an extent that has clearly
not occurred (and does not seem likely anytime soon), and he failed to predict the fall of
the Soviet Union within a decade of the publication of his work. These events do not
diminish the scholarly quality of Kennedy’s work or the fundamental validity of his
theory on the rise and fall of great powers.16 They do, however, suggest that additional
work remains to be done in analyzing the historical processes of change and conflict in
the international system and applying them to the current decline of the United States. In
this project I intend to do just that, extending Kennedy’s theory to take into account the

14

Ibid., 538.
Two of the most recent examples of this debate are Amitav Acharya’s The End of American
World Order that argues that the world has moved beyond American hegemony, and Joseph
Nye’s Is the American Century Over? that makes the case for continued American influence. See
Acharya: 2014 and Nye: 2015.
16
Kennedy’s inaccurate predictions are hardly unique, and the difficulty of predicting future
events is well known. Nevertheless, his attempts to do so did yield some useful conclusions,
including the weakness of the USSR and the importance of not over relying on economic data
alone.
15
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volatile changes of the turn of the 21th century and placing his work in the context of
existing accounts of change and conflict in the international system.
To do so, I draw on the existing rich literature that has developed in the wake of
Kennedy’s canonical work. Scholars such as Robert Gilpin, George Modelski, Robert
Keohane, Hedley Bull, and John Mearsheimer have developed a number of interwoven
theories founded in historical analysis in an attempt to answer some of the questions
made relevant by Kennedy’s prediction of American decline: How did the current
international system come into being? What structural forces are responsible for
maintaining order within it? What causes change and conflict in the international system?
And, perhaps most relevant of all, must all major change in the international system result
in conflict?

The International System
Before attempting to answer any of the above questions several more fundamental
ones must be explored. These include: what, exactly, is the international system? What do
concepts such as “change” and “conflict” mean in relation to it? How do related notions
of hegemony and disequilibrium factor into this debate?
In Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz defines the internationalpolitical system in terms of its structure and units. He argues that the latter are comprised
of states, and that the former is characterized by the condition of anarchy.17 States are the
“units” of international systems because the interactions of states define the structure of

17

Waltz: 1979, 88.
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the international system.18 An international system is comprised of multiple states that
interact with one-another in a “self-help” society in which no supreme power exists that
can provide for the security of the state, which must look out for its own survival. This
results in an international structure in which states are primarily concerned with their own
security and survival, although this is never their sole objective. Thus, a state is a political
entity with sovereignty over a given territory, and an international system is a structure in
which multiple states interact and influence one another.
In the 1970s Hedley Bull coined the term “international society” to refer to
international systems that have additional, shared characteristics.19 In international
societies, states “conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”20 Not all
international systems have been international societies; Bull uses the example of the
Ottoman empire, which for centuries was part of the European dominated international
system without being a recognized member of any international society.21 The key
difference between the two is that cooperation between states is significantly easier
within an international society because of the shared values and institutions that foster
trust among them.
Although an international system or society involves the interactions of multiple
states, this does not suggest that all the states of a particular system are equal. Indeed, all
international systems are characterized by a hierarchy of states, with no two states
18

Ibid., 92-94. It is important to note that by “state” Waltz mean a “sovereign political entity.”
This definition encompasses multiple iterations of the state such as city-states and empires, not
just the modern “nation-state.”
19
Bull: 1977, 10.
20
Ibid., 13.
21
Ibid., 14.
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possessing exactly the same level of power.22 Typically, the states that comprise an
international system are divided into “great powers” and lesser powers, with the former
receiving the overwhelming majority of analysis from historians and international
relations theorists alike.
In this work I will utilize Jack Levy’s definition of a great power as having five
distinct characteristics. First, a great power must play a major role in the security of an
international system, or at a minimum have relative self-sufficiency with respect to
military power. Second, a great power’s interests and objectives must be continental or
global, not merely regional. Third, a great power ought to defend these interests and
objectives more aggressively than other, lesser powers. Fourth, great powers are
perceived as “great” by other powers, that is, lesser powers recognize the unique
influence wielded by great powers and defer to them accordingly. Finally, great powers
are often (though not always) formally designated as such by international laws, treaties,
or membership in organizations.23 Bull establishes his own three criteria for great power
status: first, there must be two or more powers of comparable status in an international
system, second, a great power must be in the “front rank” of military status, and third,

22

By power I refer to the definition developed by Steven Lukes in “Power, A Radical View,” in
which he argues that, “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s
interests.” (Lukes: 2005, 37). This definition of power includes the ability of one state to compel
another to submit to its will using over force or persuasion when there is conflict between them
and to prevent such a conflict from ever coming to the surface in the first place. These abilities
are commonly referred to as hard and soft power and structural power respectively. See also Bull:
1977.
23
Levy: 1983, 16-17.
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great powers must be recognized by their own people as having an oversized influence in
world affairs.24
The conventional wisdom is that international systems are defined and maintained
by great powers, with lesser powers having a minor role at best in system maintenance or
change.25 In this work I largely adopt this assumption, though I take into account some of
the impacts that lesser powers can have on the stability of the international system.
Traditionally, international systems have been characterized by the relative ranking of the
great powers active within them. Thus, an international system with one overwhelmingly
dominant great power is commonly referred to as unipolar, one with two roughly equal
powers as bipolar, on with three as tripolar, and one with four or more equal great powers
as multipolar.
The modern international society has several unique characteristics that influence
the behavior of its actors. It is, first and foremost, truly global in nature. Historical
international systems (such as the Hellenistic league and Imperial China) tended to be
regional in size, limited by the sophistication of communicational and transportation
technologies of their time. The modern international system is largely unconstrained by
these limitations, and excluding a few isolated tribes spread throughout the periphery,
incorporates nearly all the world’s habitable land and impacts practically the entire
human race.

24

Bull: 1977, 200-202. The key distinction between this definition and Levy’s is the Levy added
the additional qualifications of external recognition of great power status by foreign governments,
peoples, and international institutions and laws. I believe that these are essential for modern great
power status, and as such follow Levy’s definition of a great power.
25
See the works of Kennedy, Levy, Gilpin, Bull, Mearsheimer, and Modelski for examples of this
trend.
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The principal actors of the modern state system are nation-states, a subset of states
that extend their sovereignty over a set geographical area and (relatively) culturally
homogenous population. Furthermore, the current international system is also an
international society, though the extent of this society remains contested.26 What does
seem apparent is that there are some fundamental norms (such as the Geneva convention
and the prohibition against using nuclear weapons) and institutions (such as the United
Nations and the International Monetary Fund) that are shared by nearly all participants in
the international system. There are also important cultural and ethnic divisions that have
historically split the international system, the most important of which is the separation
between the prosperous “west” – an economically, politically, and culturally connected
group of status quo powers – and the “rest” – itself a culturally diverse set of
underdeveloped and developing states.
Characterizing the polarity of the modern international system is a somewhat
trickier endeavor. Even the current number of great powers is contentious, with no
commonly agreed upon number.27 What is clear is that of the modern great powers, the
United States is by far the strongest. Militarily, politically, and (to a much lesser extent)
economically, the United States is unchallenged and unrivaled as the single dominant
state of the international system. Thus, the modern international system might be seen as
a unipolar system, although the rise of several, competing powers may soon challenge
this order. The bulk of this study is devoted to examining the implications of the rise of

26

One example of this is Huntington, who argues that the differences between civilizations
preclude any overall shared values among states. See Huntington: 1996.
27
For example Kennedy argues that Japan should count as a great power on the basis of its
economic power, Bull that it should not because it lacks a first rate military or nuclear weapons.
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these states. First, though, I define the characteristics of a unipolar or hegemondominated international system in greater detail.

Hegemony
The concept of hegemony is one of the most contested in the international
relations field, and nearly every issue related to it remains fiercely debated. It is beyond
the scope and scale of this study to do full justice to any of these issues, but I outline
below some of the most crucial questions about hegemony in the international system.
The most basic of these is what does the concept of hegemony mean in the context of the
international system? How does a hegemonic power differ from a great power? And is
hegemony merely “imperialism with good manners” or is it somehow distinct from more
coercive forms of control?28 Are hegemonic powers necessary, neutral, or detrimental to
the stability of the international system? In answering these questions scholars use
differing definitions of what hegemony means. Mearsheimer distinguishes between
regional and global hegemonies, while Bull separates hegemony from “dominance,” and
“primacy.”29 Arrighi and Modelski argue that hegemonic power cycles over the long
term, Gilpin that cyclical change has been supplanted in the modern world by a
succession of hegemonies.30 Keohane writes that hegemonic powers do not stabilize the
international system; Ikenberry and Posen contend that they do.31
In this paper I will use a simplified definition of hegemony as the economic,
social, and military dominance by one state of the international system. I follow Gilpin’s
28

Schwarzenberger: 1959 cited in Bull: 1977, 216.
See Mearsheimer: 2001 and Bull: 1977.
30
See Arrighi: 1994, Modelski: 1978, Kennedy: 1987, and Gilpin: 1981.
31
See Keohane: 1984, Ikenberry: 2014, and Posen: 2003.
29
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lead in distinguishing hegemonic states such as Great Britain in the European state
system and Athens in the classical-Greek world from empires such as Rome and classic
China.32 The primary distinction between the two is that a hegemonic power is the “first
among equals” within an international system, while an empire’s power so overwhelms
other states that there are effectively no other great powers in the international system
they inhabit.33 Some scholars, such as Ferguson, argue that the United States should be
classified as an empire, citing its military, economic, and soft power superiority over
potential rivals.34 Although some of these arguments are intriguing, they are ultimately
unhelpful in understanding the change and conflict that might develop from a decline in
American power. I will, therefore, follow Nexon and Wright, who argue that “questions
such as ‘is America an empire?’ or ‘is the international system an imperial one?’ obscure
more than they reveal.”35 The US is the leader of the modern international system, with
an oversized influence in global security and financial institutions with the world’s
largest military and economy, but it is certainly not without competitors.
The United States has reaped enormous benefits from its leadership of the
international system. Economically, the United States has benefited from a global
financial system that it largely created in the aftermath of the Second World War, and it
wields significant power in many of the international economic institutions such as the
IMF. Militarily, the United States enjoys a virtually unchallenged “command of the
commons,” the crucially important air and sea-lanes of commerce.36 Finally, the ideology

32

Gilpin: 1981, 147.
Violating Bull’s first requirement for great powers.
34
Ferguson: 2005.
35
Nexon and Wright: 2007, 266.
36
Posen: 2003.
33
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of democratic free trade and culture in the form of music and movies have become
worldwide exports, granting the United States (admittedly tacit) international
acquiescence of American leadership.37
The above statement makes the implicit assumption that the United States acts in
some sense as a “stabilizer” of the international system and preforms some tasks that are
necessary for what Gilpin terms “system maintenance,” including maintaining the
security of the global commons (traditionally this meant freedom of the sea, but in the
modern world has been extended to the air and perhaps space as well) and the principles
of the current world order (today free trade, an international monetary system, and the
right of self-determination).38 Some scholars such as Keohane contest this theory, arguing
that hegemons are unnecessary for international stability.39 Nevertheless, I will proceed
with the conventional view that the decline of American hegemony will lead to a
decrease in international cooperation and an increase in conflict. In doing so I adopt the
views of Kennedy and Gilpin that the decline of a hegemon inevitably leads to
disequilibrium in the international system, but not that disequilibrium must also lead to
violent conflict.

Disequilibrium
It is most profitable to begin the definition of disequilibrium in the international
system with the opposing state of equilibrium. I adopt Gilpin’s definition that “an
37

By tacit acquiescence I do not suggest that the international community has subordinated itself
to the will of the United States. What I do contend is that America has (thus far) avoided the sort
of counter-balancing and instability that realists such as Waltz argue should develop in a unipolar
order. That this has not occurred can, I believe, be largely attributed to American soft power.
38
Gilpin: 1981, 144-145.
39
Keohane: 1984, 143-162.
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international system is stable (i.e. in a state of equilibrium) if no great power believes it
profitable to attempt to change the system.”40 Thus, an international system is stable
when the costs to any one state of changing the system outweigh any perceived benefits it
might gain from doing so (note that stability as I use it here is a relative term, a system is
never completely stable as there is always an underlying level of jockeying among great
powers). Yet stability in the international system is never permanent. Gilpin explanation
is that:
An international system is established for the same reason that any social
or political system is created; actors enter social relations and create social
structures in order to advance particular sets of political, economic, or
other types of interests. Because the interests of some of the actors may
conflict with those of other actors, the particular interests that are most
favored by these social arrangements tend to reflect the relative powers of
the actors involved.41
Disequilibrium develops because this hierarchal structure of the international system
results in a paradox. The strength of the hegemon is necessary to maintain the stability of
the international system, but the exercise of this influence causes resentment among the
other great powers, spurring potential challengers and leading to disequilibrium. As long
as the states within an international system (or at least a system’s great powers) acquiesce
to this hierarchy, the system remains in a state of equilibrium.42
Eventually, however, the hierarchy of power and prestige within an international
system shifts. Kennedy summarizes this trend by stating:

40

Ibid., 10.
Ibid., 9.
42
Gilpin: 1981, 45. An international system remains at a state of equilibrium as long as the
underlying conflicts inevitable between states do not so fundamentally alter the structure of the
system or the distribution of resources among the great powers that they attempt to change the
system.
41
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As far as the international system is concerned, wealth and power, or
economic strength and military strength, are always relative… Since they
are relative, and since all societies are subject to the inexorable tendency
to change, then the international balances can never be still.43
Societies change and develop at differing rates, upsetting the power structure of the
international system. Moreover, this change is likely to adversely affect established
powers and benefit newly arrived ones.44 New (or newly revitalized) great powers
become disenchanted with an international system they see as unfairly benefiting the old,
established powers. Eventually, a state or alliance of states perceives that the benefits of
attempting to change the international system outweigh the potential costs. Once this
occurs an international system has entered a state of disequilibrium.
Identifying disequilibrium as it develops and creating criteria for measuring the
extent of disequilibrium within a given system is significantly more difficult than merely
stating its existence. The above definition of disequilibrium is, of course, an ideal type, a
concept that never exists in reality exactly as I have stated it here. Adding to this
difficulty is the fact that states often misread the extent to which disequilibrium is present
in the international system. Thus, some states attempt to change the international system
when the potential benefits do not outweigh the costs, while others fail to act when
conditions are favorable for change. An example of the former is Germany in both World
Wars and, of the latter, the United States in the early 20th century.45

43

Kennedy: 1987, 536.
This occurs for a variety of factors, but the most prevalent that Kennedy and Gilpin identify is
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Although the extent to which disequilibrium exists in a system is difficult to
define, the direction a system is heading is somewhat easier to ascertain. If we conceive
of a continuum representing the potential for change in an international system, with
equilibrium at one extreme and disequilibrium at the other, the direction a particular
system is moving is easier to judge and more conceptually useful than its position on the
continuum at a given time. This distinction is important because for the remainder of this
study my two overriding objectives are to demonstrate that the current international
system is moving towards disequilibrium, and to explore what might happen once it
arrives. First, I will examine and define the two related concepts of change and conflict in
the international system.

Change and Conflict in the International System
This study focuses on whether or not change and conflict are synonymous in the
context of the international system. This requires understanding some fundamental
questions involving change as it relates to the international system. The most important of
these is whether a change to the international system necessitates conflict? a more general
questions is what do the concepts mean in relationship to the international system?
Finally, do certain types or levels of change result in certain conflicts? Change in the
international system occurs once a system reaches a state of disequilibrium, leading to a
“crisis in the international system.”46 Gilpin identifies three distinct levels of change in
the international system: interaction change, systemic change, and systems change. These
categories are not mutually exclusive, and often one type of change is preceded by or
46
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results in another. Nevertheless, I will briefly define the three levels separately before
examining the types of conflict they can lead to.
Interaction change involves changes in the interactions between states in the
international system. Interaction change is the lowest level of change in the international
system, and does not impact the overall hierarchy of power and prestige in the system. It
does, however, frequently result in a change to the rights and rules of an international
system.47 Example of interaction change include the creation of an international
institution such as the International Monetary Fund to regulate international finance or a
relatively minor war between two states that results in a small redistribution of territory
without affecting the overall balance of power within the international system. Interaction
changes are the most common in the international system, but they are also typically the
least momentous. As such I will follow Gilpin’s lead in focusing on the remaining two
types of change in the international system.
The next level of analysis Gilpin identifies is systemic change. Systemic change
involves the leadership of the international system, or “the replacement of a declining
dominant power by a rising dominant power.”48 It is systemic change that Gilpin referrers
to when describing the inevitable result of disequilibrium in the international system, and
systemic change at this level is his primary focus. This attitude is mirrored in Kennedy
and Levy, and indeed, a fascination with systemic change can be traced back to
Thucydides.49 Systemic change is momentous because the new hegemonic power of an
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international system commonly changes the rules and institutions of the system to better
suit its own interests. This generally leads to a fundamental reordering of the international
system. The most recent example of systemic change has been the fall of the British
Empire and its replacement by the United States.50
Systems change is Gilpin’s largest level of analysis. It refers to a change in the
character of the international system itself.51 If all of the international system is thought
of as one great game played among the great powers; interaction changes are minor
changes of the rules of the game, systemic changes are changes of the hierarchy of the
great powers – in effect, changes to which players are “winning,” and systems changes
are changes to the nature of the game itself, most commonly via a change in the character
of its players. Great powers have always been states, but the character of the states has
changed from city-states to empires to the modern nation-states, with several other
manifestations in between. These are all systems changes. Systems change is less
common in the international system than other change, and is the most significant to its
systemic change) are extremely rare, and that the only transitions since 1640 have been Russia
surpassing Spain in 1715, and the United States surpassing Russia in 1865 (Lebow and Valentino:
2009, 397-398). These troubling findings are, however, explained by Lebow and Valentino’s
measure of power as a multiplication of a country’s population by its GDP (Ibid., 396). This
simplistic formula fails to take into account any number of crucial factors that influence a state’s
ability to effect the international system, from its geographic position to its alliance system to its
level of industrialization. These factors matter, and help explain how Great Britain managed to
conquer a quarter of the world’s landmass without ever reaching the first tier of Lebow and
Valentino’s power scale.
50
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liberal, free trade has not changed. Second, there was an unusual period of anarchy at the
beginning of the 20th during which the United States refused to initiate systemic change despite
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did so without engaging in hegemonic war against Great Britain (although the two states did, of
course, fight together in two hegemonic wars against the German and Japanese bids for
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structure. It often results in periods of anarchy or a-polarity. Some historical examples of
this anarchy are the unrest in Greece after the decline of the Greek city-states and the
thirty years war that preceded the rise of the modern nation-state in the early 1600s.52
These three levels of change are the primary mechanisms by which disequilibrium
occurs and is resolved in the international system. As was stated earlier, the three
categories are not mutually exclusive, and the international system can (and often does)
experience change at multiple levels simultaneously. Each of these levels of change
causes or involves conflict in the everyday sense of the word, but in this context I define
conflict in the international system as violent conflict between states. Each type of change
has its own unique type of conflict.
Interaction change generally results in (relatively) low intensity conflicts such as
trade wars, wars not involving great powers, and violent conflict that stops short of war
(such as terrorism, covert operations, and sabotage). Interaction conflicts can cause
tremendous human suffering and lead to the destruction or birth of one or more states, but
they do not generally affect the structure of the international system as a whole.53
Systemic change commonly corresponds with an entirely different category of
conflict. When systemic change (or attempts at systemic change) leads to open war, the
result has been some of the most destructive conflicts in human history. Levy identifies
nine such conflicts in the five hundred years of the modern international system,
including five wars that have resulted in one million or more fatalities.54 These
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“hegemonic wars” are characterized by the participation of most, if not all, great powers
in an international system, the geographic and numerical scale of the conflicts, and the
uncommonly high level of destruction they result in. In the roughly five hundred-year
history of the current international system there has not been a single systemic change
that has not resulted in (or been the result of) a hegemonic war.55
Conflict that leads to systems change is more difficult to identify or define than
those which involve systemic or interaction change. The primary reason for this is that
systems change generally takes place alongside systemic change, and the two types of
conflict can prove difficult to separate. An example of this is the Thirty Years War,
which was a hegemonic war that also influenced systems change.56 It is easier to identify
systems change by the period of anarchy that follows it than it is to find a single conflict
that causes it. Thus the fall of the Roman Empire was a systems change that led to
centuries of anarchy in the European state system, but it is difficult to identify a single
conflict that led to the fall of the Empire.57 If future systems change follows in this
historical pattern, it will likely be more remembered for the anarchy that ensues than for
the conflict or conflicts that preceded it.

the Thirty Years War. Note that this data only includes wars within the European state system
through the 20th century.
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Conclusion
Historically, disequilibrium in the international system has developed as the costs
to the leading hegemon of maintaining the system have outstripped the hegemon’s ability
to enforce order. Other, rising powers challenge the established states and change the
hierarchy of power and prestige, seeking to restructure the international system in their
own favor. Once a challenging state believes that the perceived benefits of changing the
system outweigh the possible costs, the international system has entered a state of
disequilibrium.
Once disequilibrium develops, it is either resolved when the established power
successfully reestablishes equilibrium, or it results in interaction, systemic, or systems
change. Systemic and systems change are particularly serious, as neither has taken place
outside the context of a hegemonic war or series of wars. In their respective books,
Kennedy and Gilpin apply these concepts to the modern international system to predict
future change within it.
I utilize this approach in studying how the rise of new great powers has
contributed to disequilibrium in the international system. I examine the levels of change
that might result from a move towards disequilibrium and the potential for conflict these
changes could create. I study the ways in which the United States has so far attempted to
react to change to the global order, and where appropriate suggest ways in which the
United States could act to reduce disequilibrium and attempt to prevent change leading to
conflict.
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III The New Great Powers
The Rise of the Modern International System
Two numbers documenting the transformation of the modern international system
stand out. At the end of the 19th century, the United States controlled 14.7 percent of the
relative shares of world manufacturing output. Within a half century, this share of world
manufacturing had doubled to roughly a third of the total world manufacturing output.58
Over that same period the United States military grew from a force of 34,000 to 12.5
million men.59 These figures are important in two respects. They demonstrate that it is
relatively easy for a wealthy industrialized state to embark on a massive armaments
program over a short period of time, and they represent a remarkable shift in the
economic and military balance of power of the international system. The simultaneous
rise of Germany, Japan, Italy, and the Soviet Union led to two world wars and the
fundamental transformation of the international system. The established European great
powers were eclipsed by the rise of Russia and the United States, whose struggle for
hegemony over the international system structured the second half of the 20th century.
The new international order shaped by the United States was characterized by
principles of free trade, liberalism, and international rule of law. The United States
enforced and shaped these principles through the creation of international institutions
such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
Though these were international institutions, they were heavily influenced by American
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interests, and (at least at first) were largely dependent on American funds for their
operation and American power for their legitimization.60
When the Soviet Union recovered economically and military from the damage it
had endured during the Second World War and successfully broke the American nuclear
monopoly in 1949, it emerged as a peer competitor to the American dominated
international system. The United States responded by further committing itself to the
maintenance of the new international order, creating the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) as a military check to the Soviet Union and funding the Marshall
Plan to rebuild Europe.61 Under the doctrine of containment the United States expanded
its political and military interests to regions of the globe where it had previously had only
economic relations, including Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South East
Asia.62 The end of the Cold War removed the last short-term challenge to American
hegemony, and some scholars predicted that the international system was, after the
bloodiest century in human history, finally stable.63
Sadly, events of the previous two decades have done little to encourage this view.
Instead, over the last twenty years the international system has slowly moved towards
disequilibrium, not stability. The United States remains the world’s strongest economic
power, but its relative share of world wealth has declined significantly since the end of
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the Second World War.64 This has largely been a result of the rise of new economic
competitors, including Brazil, India, China, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union.
This economic competition has not yet translated to a direct military challenge to United
States, except in one critically important arena. Since 1950 the club of nuclear-armed
nations has expanded from only the US and USSR to encompass China, India, Pakistan,
Israel, France, The UK, and North Korea.65 These developments abroad have coincided
with political gridlock, the emergence of neo-isolationism, and a massive budget deficit
within the United States. The international system is not yet in a state of disequilibrium,
and the vast majority of the world’s states (and all of its great powers) continue to accept
the legitimacy of American leadership of the international system.66
The continued legitimacy of existing institutions and norms has greatly
contributed to the stability of the international system, raising the potential costs to any
state seeking to fundamentally change the current order.67 As a result the majority of the
challenges against the United States have occurred within the bounds of the system itself.
When Russia confronts American diplomats it does so within the context of the United
Nations in New York City, China condemns “American imperialism” while relying on
the American Navy to maintain the security of the sea-lanes on which it depends to
import the raw materials necessary for growth, and nearly every state on earth conducts
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the majority of their trade in American dollars, no matter their relations to Washington.68
Nevertheless, as the economic balance continues to shift from the United States towards
developing states in Asia, the Middle East, and South America the challenges to
American hegemony are likely to increase.
In the following section I explore the elements of this international system that
developed in the aftermath of the Second World War, identify the existing great powers,
and explore how the rise new great powers – the BRIC nations of Brazil, Russia, India,
and China – has constrained the ability of the United States to maintain hegemony over
the international system.69 I argue that this growth has not yet led to the imperial
overstretch predicted by Kennedy and Gilpin, but it has spread American resources thin
at a time when the United States faces challenges on all fronts. The emergence of Brazil
has led to serious economic competition close to home, given rise to vocal support for
reform of international monetary institutions, and weakened the centuries-old American
hold over the western hemisphere. Russia’s reemergence as a great power has forced the
United States to recommit to the NATO alliance, boosting the number of soldiers the US
stations in Europe and damaging American-European relations.70 India, with its new
Prime Minister and title as the world’s largest democracy, can now successfully force
significant interaction change and serve as an alternative to the American monopoly on
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soft power.71 Finally, China, with it’s booming economy, gigantic population, and
regional political and military power, has the ability to force the United States to react to
its rise, altering the distribution of power in the international system by its very existence.

The Modern Great Powers
An important factor that has lent stability to the international system in recent
decades has been the relative harmony of interests among the existing great powers.
Before exploring the rise of potential challengers to the international system it is,
therefore, worth exploring which are the great powers, and why they have not shown the
same willingness to compete for power and prestige that great powers historically have.
Utilizing Levy’s definition of a great power as having the following five characteristics:
self-sufficiency with respect to military power, global interests or objectives,
“aggressive” foreign policy (that is, an expressed willingness to defend international
interests), recognition of great power status by other great powers, and, finally, formal
designation of status by international laws, treaties, or membership in international
organizations; I identify five current great powers: The United States, Russia, China,
France, and the United Kingdom.72
Levy’s five criteria exclude several states that are sometimes considered – and
indeed act – like great powers, notably Japan, India, and Germany. All three lack the
institutional recognition of a seat on the UN security consul. More importantly, Japan and
Germany do not have the ability to properly defend themselves in the case of an attack,
71
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although they could presumably remedy this within a few decades if they so choose.73
India possesses a nuclear arsenal and a developed military, but has not yet fully
articulated significant global interests, so is better categorized as a potential great power
than a current one.
Of the five existing great powers, three – the United States, France and the United
Kingdom – are status quo powers. They are the primary benefactors of the international
order and – though they have certain strategic disagreements – are fundamentally united
in preserving equilibrium in the system. China and Russia are not content with the
international system as it is currently ordered. The struggle between the Soviet Union and
the United States for control of the international system has already nearly led to one
hegemonic war, and this conflict has not disappeared with the fall of the Soviet Union.74
China is a new (or newly revitalized) great power, and although it is only the first of
several rising nations to attain great power status, it has already substantially shifted the
balance of power throughout the international system.75 Thus of the five current great
powers four are established and one, China, continues its rise economically and
militarily.
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The Rise of Challengers
Despite the Cold War, the modern international system has sustained a significant
seven-decade long absence of great power war or serious challenge to the system.76
Scholars have pointed to any number of potential causes of this stability, from free trade
and economic interdependence and the proliferation of sovereign democratic
governments to the destructive potential of modern nuclear weapons.77 Despite these
stabilizing factors, the international order is starting to appear less stable than it did even
a few decades ago. Internally, the United States displays some alarming signs in its large
debt, flat-lined middle class wages, and political stalemate. Domestic dissatisfaction with
the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has contributed to a new wave of neoisolationism within the US, which has mirrored external dissatisfaction with how the
United States has chosen to wield its power and influence abroad.78 At the same time,
new powers have risen in the preceding few decades at a truly astounding rate. In 2000
the combined GDPs of India, China, and Brazil accounted for only twenty percent of
American GDP. By 2010, this proportion had risen to seventy-five percent.79 In contrast
to historical cases, this economic rise has not corresponded to a proportional shift in the
military balance of power, but it remains unclear whether this represents a short-term lag
or a longer-term disruption to historical trends.
It is easy to overstate the near-term implications of the economic rise of
challengers to American hegemony. In a 2009 article Josef Joffe identifies five “waves”
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of declinist thinking among western intellectuals, beginning with “Sputnik shock” in the
fifties.80 In the sixties President Kennedy ‘s administration spoke of a “missile gap” with
the Soviet Union. In the seventies the failure of the Vietnam War and the recovery of
Europe prompted scholars and policy makers such as Nixon and Kissinger to predict the
rise of a new multipolar order. In the eighties, Paul Kennedy prophesied the rise of Japan
and the gradual decline of the United States.81 Of course, these predictions all proved to
be misguided. The nineties were the only decade since the launch of Sputnik that didn’t
result in any significant declinist literature, as the end of the Cold War and the economic
woes of Japan gave rise to a new optimism in the enduring nature of the American-led
international system.82
Unfortunately, this optimism has been short lived. As early as 2001 Mearsheimer
was predicting the end of the unipolar moment and the rise of a new multipolar order.83
Since then, the United States has endured the terror of September 11th, the economic,
political, and social costs of two unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the worst
economic crisis since the great depression. All this has been accompanied by the rapid
rise of the BRIC nations of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Although these nations are
not yet able to directly challenge the United States for control over the international
system, their rise is nevertheless a momentous occasion.
Since the end of the Second World War the only great power to actively seek
systemic change was the Soviet Union. Now Russia has already been joined by China in
pushing for change (although their broader strategic aims are by no means identical), and
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the future rise of two new great powers has the potential to fundamentally disrupt the
equilibrium of the system by shifting the balance of power away from those nations that
favor stability over change. Furthermore, these rising powers represent new forces that
cannot be compelled by the United States, constraining its potential options for action
(two examples of this are Russia’s veto of UN resolutions attempting to end the Syrian
Civil War and Brazil’s blockage of American attempts to extend NAFTA to South
America). These events have given rise to a new wave of predictions of American decline
from scholar such as Ferguson, Friedberg, and Posen.84 In the sections below I examine
some of the challenges these BRIC states face as they continue to rise, and explore some
of the implications of their success to the stability of the current international system.

Brazil
Many commentators looked at the 2014 World Cup in Brazil as something of a
failure for the host nation.85 The costs of hosting the match were astronomical; the
Brazilian infrastructure was poorly equipped to handle the roughly one million foreigners
who arrived for the cup, and the games were marred by political protests by Brazilians
who believed their country should have focused on cutting corruption and reducing
poverty instead of pouring money into an international sporting event.86 The anger of the
protesters demonstrates one of a multitude of problems Brazil must overcome if it is to
continue its rise, from widespread poverty and unemployment to government corruption
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and inefficiency.87 Nevertheless, if Brazil can overcome its current economic and social
woes it has the potential to become a serious contender on the world stage and a great
power in its own right.
The rise of Brazil has not been as triumphed or dramatic as that of the other BRIC
nations. Brazil is not as populous as India and China, and its growth rate has been less
dramatic, currently at a sluggish 2.3 percent.88 Despite these setbacks, in the last thirty
years the Brazilian economy has exhibited tremendous growth.89 For the first time since
the end of the Spanish-American war the United States faces a significant economic
power in the western hemisphere. With the world’s fifth largest landmass and population,
a secure geographic position, and a stable (if new and sometimes faltering) democratic
political system, Brazil will become an influential player on the global stage, even if does
not make the diplomatic and military investments necessary to become a full-fledged
great power.90
Although Brazil’s potential power is clear, its interests and objectives are
significantly less so. Certainly, Brazil desires enhanced economic growth, which gives it
a significant vested interest in preserving the stability of the current international order.
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Brazil also wants international influence and recognition, however, and if its attempts at
gradual change and continually rebuffed by the established powers it is possible its drive
for recognition will outweigh its desire for stability.91 Brazil has already fought and won
important battles at the WTO against European and American agricultural subsidies, and
when the United States attempted to extend NAFTA to South America via the Free Trade
Area of the Americas, Brazil and Argentina scuttled the deal by refusing to sign.92
Furthermore, Brazilian multinational corporations are growing and proliferating, and in
the face of American hostility, they are forming more joint ventures with Chinese
companies.93 These economic ties are already beginning to turn political, and Brazilian
and Chinese leaders now speak of a “new South-South relationship.”94
The United States should take such developments seriously. Brazil lacks the
military or political capability to directly challenge the United States; it’s not a member
of the nuclear club, and its focus on economic development will make it leery of
attempting to significantly challenge the status quo of the international system in the
short-term. But Brazil is an emerging power, and as it continues to grow it will exert
itself with greater force as it seeks to challenge what it sees as unfair aspects of the
international order. If the United States continues to oppose these efforts it risks turning
Brazil from an economic competitor into a strategic one, and converting the Brazilian-
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Chinese “special relationship” to a genuine alliance. The long-term consequences of such
an alliance to the stability of the American led international system are certain to be
negative, and could easily lead to increased disequilibrium and a push for change.

Russia
To discus Russia as a member of the rising BRIC states appears somewhat
disingenuous, considering that Russia today is significantly weaker in military and
economic terms than the Soviet Union was during the Cold War.95 Since the 1980s
Russia has lost thousands of miles of territory and millions of its citizens to newly created
autonomous states along its western frontier. Its economy has gone from being the
world’s second largest to the eighth, surpassed in recent decades by China, Japan, The
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Brazil.96 Over the same period Russia’s military
and political superiority in Eastern Europe and East Asia has been diminished by the
expansion of the European Union and NATO and the rise of Chinese economic and
military power.97
Though not as strong as the Soviet Union was three decades ago, Russia is
significantly more powerful than it was in the wake of the disastrous collapse of the
Soviet Union in the 1990s. President Vladimir Putin may be widely reviled in the west,
but his continuing domestic popularity suggests that Russians, at least, believe that he has
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improved their standing in the world.98 Despite this, Russia remains haunted by many of
the same weaknesses that crippled the Soviet Union, including high-level corruption, an
economy overly reliant on oil and gas, and an aggressive foreign policy agenda that wins
few friends abroad. It also faces several new threats, including a dangerous demographic
problem brought on by rampant alcoholism and a lack of social cohesion.99
Yet Russia remains a great power in its own right. It retains the largest land army
in Europe, backed by a significant air force and navy, and controls most of Europe’s
supply of oil and gas, which it has used as a political tool more than once.100 It has a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which it has consistently used to frustrate
US-backed initiatives. And of course, Russia possesses the world’s second largest nuclear
arsenal.101 Russia is not a rising power on the order of India or China; indeed it may soon
prove to be a declining one. Nevertheless, as long as Russia retains the military
advantages outlined above it will remain an important factor in world politics.
When the Soviet Union collapsed it appeared for a time that Russia might finally
fully integrate with the west and end decades of tension and conflict. Unfortunately,
relations between Russia and the west are now at their worst since the end of the Cold
War.102 President Putin’s backing of separatist movements in Georgia and Ukraine has
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sparked international condemnation, as has his ongoing support of Bashar al-Assad’s
brutal regime in Syria. Western commentators have often misread these moves as
irrational and outdated mistakes by an out of touch Putin.103 They are not. Putin is a
shrewd political operator responding to the desires of the Russian people for a new
Russian empire and resisting what he sees as the dangerous expansion of the west into
Eastern Europe.104 He managed to prevent a western military response to Assad’s use of
chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War, preserving Assad’s regime and making
President Obama appear weak and indecisive in the process.
Putin’s actions in Ukraine have had a higher cost, resulting in international
condemnation and western economic sanctions. Despite sanctions, Russia successfully
annexed Crimea and highlighted deep divisions between the United States and some of
its European allies in the process.105 Russia can be expected to continue aggressively
resisting the spread of NATO and EU membership in Eastern Europe as long as it has the
strength to do so. Putin will likely continue the strategy he has deployed in Georgia and
Ukraine – using the plight of Russian speaking minorities to legitimize (at least to his
own people) Russian military intervention in neighboring regions.
These acts violate two fundamental tenants of the international system: the right
of every nation to self-determination and the prohibition against the use of force in
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resolving geopolitical conflicts.106 By doing so Russia implicitly challenges the
hegemonic position of the United States, creating the potential for a push for systemic
change of the leadership structure of the international system. Russia has already
attempted systemic change throughout the Cold War, and though its potential was greater
then, it was ultimately unsuccessful.107 The difference is that during the Cold War the
Soviet Union was largely on its own, and it and its allies were forced to operate outside
the bounds of the international system. Now Russia is a more integrated part of the
international community and, with the rise of the other BRIC nations, is no longer alone
in challenging the status quo.108
Still, Russia is not the force it was thirty years ago, and its economy and social
order are in poor shape, with little hope for improvement. The weakness of the Russian
economy is such that western sanctions over Ukraine combined with the November
OPEC decision not to reduce oil production (and prevent the recent slide in global oil and
gas prices) could end up costing Russia over 130 billion dollars a year, roughly seven
percent of its entire GDP.109 It is entirely possible that Russia is entering a long decline,
and its economic success in the 2000s was an anomaly driven by high global oil prices
and little else. Even if this is the case, though, Russia will remain an important and
potentially destabilizing force in world politics.
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Empires in decline can cause more instability to the international system than
ascendant ones; history is full of examples of states that have gone to war because they
fear they will lose the ability to do so in the future.110 A Russia with an economy and
society in crisis that retains a sizable military and a strong authoritarian leader could
prove dangerous indeed. Russia’s military strength and aggressive foreign policy will
distract the United States, forcing it to expand military assets and political capital reacting
to Putin’s moves instead of investing them in other system maintenance tasks. This has
the potential to dilute American resources to the point of overstretch by raising the costs
of preserving the international system at a moment when the American people have
grown weary of paying for what they see as unnecessary foreign engagement. Even if
Russia does not succeed in reestablishing any form of empire it has the potential to
contribute to the decline of the United States, tying up resources and constraining
American action, allowing less over-committed great powers to make gains relative to the
United States.111 Finally, whether it rises or falls, Russia will retain over 8,000 nuclear
warheads in its arsenal, the majority of which remain aimed at the west.112 This, if
nothing else, will keep Russia in the great power camp for the foreseeable future.
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India
When Prime Minister Modi of India visited the United States for the first time in
2014 he received a rock star reception from the Indian-American population. At Madison
Square Garden Modi spoke before a crowd of 18,000 Indian-Americans and promised
them a future in which India was strong, independent, and free from corruption, poverty,
and pollution.113 He has a lot of work to do. There were 80 million homeless Indians as of
a 2011 census, and although India has the world’s 10th largest economy, it has the 142nd
largest GDP per capita.114 As Indian-American academic Fareed Zakaria wrote in 2008,
“The country might have several Silicon Valleys, but it also has three Nigerias within
it… more than 300 million people living on less than a dollar a day.”115 In addition to
these economic woes, India is plagued by religious and regional strife, health issues
related to environmental degradation and pollution, and a difficult geographic position
with hostile Pakistan to the west and a China that is growing at an even faster pace than
India to the north.
Despite all this, India remains the largest democracy in the world, with an
economy that has grown at an impressive seven percent over much of the past two
decades (although this has slowed significantly in the past two years).116 Assuming this
drop in growth is likely a short-term phenomenon (as early 2014 economic data suggests
it is), India can be expected to become the world’s third largest economy by around
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2040.117 This growth will undoubtedly be helped by India’s demographic strength;
India’s population continues to grow at a rapid rate, meaning it will continue to possess a
robust workforce well into the future, something that China, Russia, Japan, and much of
Europe will have to struggle with in the decades to come.118 Demographic trends have
important implications for future economic growth, and India’s current normal growth
rate of 1.25 percent is substantially larger than the US rate of .77 percent and the Chinese
rate of .44 percent.119 If this trend continues India is set to become the most populous
nation on earth by sometime around 2028, furthering its potential as a great power.
When Paul Kennedy analyzed what he saw as the potential challengers to
American hegemony in the 1980s, he devoted no space to India’s potential.120 At the
time, India’s economy had not yet entered its two-decade growth spurt, and India’s
primary foreign policy objective was nonalignment: an attempt to stay out of the global
struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. This period has ended. At the
2008 Doha round of WTO negotiations, India single-handedly brought the negotiations to
a standstill after the European Union and United States failed to agree to continuing
Indian agricultural subsidies, the first time a developing country successfully halted a free
trade agreement it saw as unbalanced.121 India refused to lift its veto of planned WTO
reforms until the United States agreed to allow the continuation of Indian food
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stockpiling practices, a minor change to WTO rules that nevertheless demonstrates
India’s growing weight in that body’s deliberations.122
India also possesses a tool that China and Russia do not – significant soft power.
Soft power is the ability of one state to influence another without the use or threat of
force, an important capability in an age where the international community is quick to
condemn the overt use of force by one state against another. The United States has
tremendous reserves of soft power, from the global reach of Hollywood to the draw of
liberal democracy to the benefits it receives from securing the world’s trade lanes.123
China, by contrast, possesses relatively little soft power, and Russia wields none at all.124
India does have significant soft power, and though it is nowhere near equal that of the
United States, it is growing at a rapid clip. Bollywood has a fraction of Hollywood’s
budget, but it produces almost double the number of movies and they are now watched
across Asia, and increasingly in other parts of the world as well.125 Indian cuisine is
world renown, and Indian architectural and fashion styles are growing in popularity.126
Finally, although India’s government is flawed; it has remained a relatively stable and
representative voice for India’s hundreds of diverse ethnic and religious groups. These
factors matter, indeed they may prove more important than traditional indices of state
power such as navel tonnage and army size.
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Furthermore, India is making great strides in research and development, a vital
investment for future growth. A very tangible expression of these efforts was the recent
successful Indian mission to Mars. In September of 2014 India succeeded in sending a
satellite into orbit around Mars on its very first attempt – a feat that few nations have
achieved.127 Furthermore, it did so at a cost of roughly one tenth that of an equivalent
American version.128 India has far fewer resources than the United States, but at times
this has spurred creative development and greater efficiency. In the end, India’s ability to
innovate might pose a greater threat to continued American leadership than a strategic
rivalry between the two nations.
India’s place in the world is uncertain, its global ambitions largely undefined.
India has not yet converted its economic potential or soft power into significant political
objectives, beyond its non-alignment past. This policy served India well while it was
weak, but if India is to mature into a genuine great power it can no longer remain neutral
from the struggles of other great powers. The United States too maintained an aloof
posture for much of its early history, and only became a great power decades after it was
already the world’s largest economic power. India, however, is unlikely to have this
luxury. Surrounded by potential threats on all sides, India will soon be forced to clearly
articulate its foreign policy objectives. Critically, India will have to decide whether it
wants to balance China’s rise by allying with the United States or bandwagon with China
and attempt to force systemic change within the international system. Either way, India’s
traditional decision to remain neutral will become less and less of an option.
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China
Of all the rising powers, there is only one that has truly captured academic and
public attention. Only one has generated a new wave of publications with sensationalist
titles such as A Contest For Supremacy, Still Ours to Lead, and, The Post-American
World.129 Brazil and India pose economic and soft power challenges to the American-led
system. Russia is a political and military competitor with a hefty nuclear arsenal and
structural power in the form of a UN Security Consul seat. But only China has the
medium-term potential to compete with the United States on all of the above fronts.130
Economically, China has the world’s second largest economy, growing at a rate that leads
many scholars to predict that it will overtake the American economy in absolute size
sometime between the 2020s and 2040s.131 Structurally, China enjoys a permanent seat
on the UN Security Consul and is impatiently pushing for more of a voice in economic
institutions such as the IMF, and is creating competing institutions when its efforts are
rebuffed.132 Militarily, China might lack a significant “blue water” or expeditionarycapable navy, but it is rapidly developing a force that could potentially deny the United
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States access to much of the western Pacific.133 Furthermore, China currently possesses
land force far larger than its chief regional rivals such as India, Japan, and South Korea,
and a sizable nuclear force of roughly 194 operational warheads.134
Finally, China has thus far demonstrated that sustained economic growth is
possible without political liberalization, in the process overturning the comforting
western assumption that in the modern world, economic prosperity is tied to
democratization. By doing so, China has the potential to become what many in the west
already fear. As an inflammatory article in Foreign Affairs puts it, “Never mind notions
of a responsible stakeholder; China has become a revolutionary power.”135
Assessing the accuracy of such predictions is difficult to say the least, most
notably because of the opaqueness of the Chinese political system. For decades China has
followed reformer and political leader Deng Xiaoping's advice to “Hide brightness,
cherish obscurity” by downplaying China’s rise and acting with restraint on the
international stage.136 By and large this policy has been successful, allowing China to
forge essential economic ties to traditional adversaries in the region such as Japan, South
Korea, and the United States that might otherwise have combined to contain it.137 There
are, however, increasing signs that China’s era of self-imposed restraint is drawing to a
close.
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Between 2001 and 2007 Chinese trade with Southeast Asia, Africa, and South
America increased 600 percent, driven by a push for the natural resources China needs to
continue to grow.138 In 2009 in response to the global financial crisis the Chinese centralbank governor suggested that it was time to move away from the dollar as the world’s
reserve currency.139 More troublingly, China has recently taken provocative steps over
territory that is contested with Vietnam, the Philippians and Japan, the latter two of which
have US security commitments, raising the risks of an accidental clash that could spiral
into a conflict nobody desires.140
These actions all suggest that China is beginning to act more assertively on the
world stage, the key question is whether this newfound activism will take place within
the confines of the existing international system or as a revolutionary attempt to
overthrow it. There is no academic consensus on this question, perhaps because the
Chinese themselves are not quite sure what to do with their newfound power. A recent
Brookings institute publication divides Chinese strategists into five camps: “Nativists”
who act as the Chinese equivalent to American isolationists, those that focus on “Asia
first” and believe China should focus on becoming the preeminent power in Asia, those
that believe China should remain tied to its “global South” nonalignment roots as the
leader of the developing countries, “selective multilateralists” who push for greater
economic ties to the rest of the world, and, most importantly, the Chinese realists, with
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their emphasis on sovereignty and great power relations.141 The consensus among China
watchers is that the realists have the most power, but all five groups continue to articulate
often-contradictory views on what China’s future role should be.
Whatever path Beijing decides to take will be fraught with difficulties. The
“Chinese model” of economic liberalism and political authoritarianism can only
reasonably be expected to hold together as long as Chinese economic growth remains
high.142 If growth slows the Chinese government can expect to face unrest that makes
current widespread protests seem mild in comparison. This should be deeply troubling for
the Chinese leadership, since maintaining high growth rates will be difficult in the
coming decades. This is due to the “middle income trap,” the situation in which a vastly
growing economy is forced to make a transition to high-end manufacturing as rising
incomes decrease the supply of cheap labor.143 This transition has traditionally slowed or
even stalled growth, and in China’s case this effect could be confounded by a
demographic problem resulting from China’s “one child” laws.144
Even if China can somehow advert these economic and domestic woes it faces
and extremely difficult geostrategic situation. Despite all of China’s recent economic
foreign investments it has few friends and many potential rivals. To the southwest is
India, to the north, Russia, to the northeast, the economic powerhouses of South Korea
and Japan, backed by American security guarantees and a significant American troop
presence, to the southeast Australia, Indonesia, and New Zealand. Finally, there is
Taiwan, the island who’s continued independence from the mainland has proved a
141
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consistent source of embarrassment to the Chinese government, but who’s security is
guaranteed by the United States.145 If China continues to assert itself it risks driving these
countries even closer to the United States, but if it does nothing it remains complacent in
the status quo. China faces an additional, even greater check to potential expansion. In
order to fuel its growth China needs to import an enormous quantity of energy and food,
and nearly all of it passes through the straits of Hormuz and Malacca.146 The United
States possesses the only navy in the world capable of keeping these straits open, and
would face little military trouble in closing them, effectively strangling China in the
process. It is an endless source of insecurity for a state in which trade makes up seventy
percent of its economy that the security of this trade depends on the warships of its
greatest strategic rival.
The rise of China has been swift, impressive, and deeply disconcerting to many in
the west. It will almost certainly soon become the world’s largest economy, only fitting
considering it is home to 1.36 billion people.147 As China continues to grow economically
it will inevitably attempt to increase its political weight in the international system. If it
does so within the confines of the current international system China has the opportunity
to gradually expand its influence in the world while avoiding a rebalancing alliance led
by the United States. If, however, the rise of China is swift or forceful enough to
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destabilize the region, it has the potential to result in new arms races, regional conflict,
or, at worst, hegemonic war with the United States.

The Others
Of course the BRIC nations and existing great powers are not the only states that
will have an important impact on the long-term stability of the international system. First
and foremost are the other rising powers, the countries whose growth is significant but
not as spectacular as that of Brazil, India, and China. The most important members of this
group include South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico, South Africa, and Saudi
Arabia.148 Of these, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are firm allies of the United
States, though in the case of Turkey increasing autocratic tendencies within the ruling
AKP party may damage this alliance.149 Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa are not
American allies, but they are not opposed to any key American interests either. Critically,
all six rising middle powers are keenly aware that they depend on the open trade and
international rule of law that the international system provides to continue their growth.
They might push for interaction change in the guise of minor reforms of the system, but
they lack the inclination or capability to attempt systemic change.
Another influential grouping of states is the European Union; the twenty-eight
European states that together constitute the world’s largest trading block.150 In the
aftermath of the Cold War there was some speculation that the EU might grow into a
148
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genuine “super state” with the economic and political muscle to challenge the United
States for control of the international system.151 In fact the opposite has taken place, and
in recent years the European Union has moved toward less, not more, unity. Unless a
dramatic change occurs in the next few decades it seems unlikely to expect that the
European Union will morph into anything more than an economic union. Of the EU’s
member states, only three, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, are strategically
significant. As has already been explored, the UK and France are both firmly status quo
powers; they are allies of the United States and the current international system largely
suits their own interests. A somewhat more uncertain case, Germany possesses Europe’s
largest economy and a sizable military.152 Still, Germany is constrained by its
membership in the EU and its own bloody history. As long as those factors continue
Germany is unlikely to attempt to challenge the status quo or seek to become a great
power in its own right.
Finally, there is Japan, the state that was once predicted to challenge American
hegemony in the 21st century.153 In the 1980s Japan’s then extraordinary economic
growth convinced some that it would be the next leader of the international system by
virtue of its economic potential alone. Instead, Japan soon entered a decade and a half of
stagnated growth and recession that it is only now beginning to pull out of. These efforts
will most likely be harmed by Japan’s own impending demographic problem, which is far
worse than that facing any other state today.154 Nevertheless, Japan remains an important
great power in its own right, albeit one without nuclear weapons or offensive military
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capabilities. Japan is a vital United States ally, particularly in the event of a SinoAmerican confrontation. If the United States loses its credibility in Asia due to a rise in
Chinese power it might spark a resurgent militarism within Japan. Otherwise, Japan too is
unlikely to seek to disturb the status quo.

Conclusion
It is easy to misread the rise of new powers. Taken individually, none of the BRIC
nations, not even China, can challenge the supremacy of the United States. Nor do they
necessarily want to force a confrontation with the United States; even China recognizes
the crucial role the United States plays in maintaining the international stability that
allows it its unprecedented growth.155 The rise of the new great powers matters
regardless, because by their very existence they raise the cost of system maintenance for
the United States. The United States currently maintains roughly 66,000 troops in
Europe, the vast majority of whom serve as NATO guards against renewed Russian
nationalism.156 There are 40,000 troops in Japan, and an additional 35,000 in South
Korea.157 Although these personnel fulfill multiple roles in East Asia (the most important
of which is the prevention of renewed hostilities between North and South Korea), they
also serve as a deterrent to Chinese military intervention in Taiwan and prevent an arms
race in the region. These deployments – and the ten carrier battle groups that support
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them – explain much of why the United States contributes roughly 45 percent of global
military spending.158
The economic competition posed by the BRIC nations further undermines the
ability of the United States to maintain the status quo. India might not directly challenge
American hegemony, but the growth of its technological and service sectors put pressure
on their American equivalents, indirectly weakening the economic foundations of
American hegemony. The same can be said of China and Brazil. By continued growth
alone the BRIC nations contribute to disequilibrium by raising the costs of maintaining
the status quo and altering the great power balance. If these trends continue the United
States will be faced with the same crisis that has afflicted every historical hegemon; it
will no longer be able to maintain the system it created.159
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IV The Constraints to Continued American Leadership
The Pressure for Change
The economic and political growth of the BRIC states has pushed the
international system towards disequilibrium, creating a growing imbalance between the
costs of system maintenance and the ability of the United States to continue paying. If the
United States is able to accommodate the more reasonable aspirations of the rising
powers – such as institutional recognition in the form of greater voice in the IMF and
permanent seats on the UN Security Council – it has the potential to co-opt them into
supporting the international status quo. This will allow for some interaction and systemic
change without damaging the underlying norms and characteristics of the international
system or resulting in a direct challenge to American authority. The alternative could be
the hegemonic conflict that has historically accompanied systemic change.160
In this section I analyze the pressures for change throughout the international
system and outline some of the steps the United States could take to mitigate the risks of
major systemic and systems change. In a 2010 study on the future of American power
Joseph Nye likened the distribution of power in the international system to a game of
chess played on three chessboards representing military competition, economic rivalry,
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and “transnational relations” respectively.161 Nye’s model is a useful way to
conceptualize the distribution of power, and I adopt it here as a way to organize change in
the international system. This, however, necessitates the addition of a new dimension of
“level of change” to Nye’s chess game.
The three-dimensional game of chess is being played for vastly different stakes.
On the bottom level, the stakes are interaction change, involving institutional
representation, relatively minor shifts in economic potential, and change in military
capabilities that do not fundamentally alter the hierarchy of power in the international
system. The second level deals with systemic change. Here the stakes are much higher,
involving shifts to the military balance of power, extensive change of the economic
potential of the great powers, and the transformation of global perception and
institutional recognition of various states. The final level involves systems change, which
entails change to which entities are “allowed” to play on each board. Though great
powers currently dominate the military chessboard, they seem to be losing ground to
nuclear- armed middle powers, non-states actors such as trans-national drug
organizations, and terrorist groups. Similarly, some have argued that private entities
(corporations) and regional blocks (such as the European Union) are challenging the
state’s control over the economic board.162 Finally, a systems shift is already underway
on the transnational relations board, where actors as diverse as states, corporations,
NGOs, terrorists, and filmmakers vie for international recognition.163
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With this matrix as a guide, I break the international system into four geographic
regions and study the potentials and consequences of change at each level and across
each spectrum of power. The regions are the Western Hemisphere, European
subcontinent, Asia, and Africa and the Middle East. The first three regions each contain
one or more BRIC states that have the potential to instigate change of some form.164 The
fourth region – Africa and the Middle East – currently has no potential great power.
Nevertheless, there are moves towards systems changes that are taking place in the region
that have an impact on the equilibrium and structure of the international system. With this
in mind, I turn to an analysis of the potentials for change in the coming decades and how
the United States might reasonably respond to prevent further disequilibrium.

The Western Hemisphere
Long before the United States rose to great power – let alone superpower – status
it dominated the Western Hemisphere. As early as the 1848 end of the MexicanAmerican War the United States had become the preeminent local power in the western
hemisphere. A half-century later the Spanish-American War demonstrated the United
States’ capacity and willingness to enforce it’s claim to regional hegemony.165 For the
last century the United States has continued as the sole economic, military, and political
giant in the western hemisphere, and has reaped the rewards of having a secure and stable
geographic position within a vast network of relatively open markets.166 On the military
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level this situation is unlikely to change anytime soon, but the economic and structural
rise of Brazil and the continuing recognition among Latin American countries of past
injustices threatens local stability.167 If the United States can adapt to some of the
pressing interaction changes desired by its Southern neighbors it can hope to stave off
disequilibrium in the region. If not, American power in the Americas might face its first
significant challenge in over a century.
On an economic level, the dominance of the United States over the western
hemisphere has waned for decades. In 2011 the GDP of Latin America grew at an
average of 5.6 percent compared to 1.6 percent growth for the United States.168 Though
much of this growth has been driven by the rise of Brazil the region overall is
significantly wealthier than it was even a decade ago.169 The United States will likely
remain the wealthiest nation in the western hemisphere for the foreseeable future, and
even the more well-off Latin American states lack the infrastructure, innovation, and
resources at the disposal of the United States. Nor is a European Union style economic
union in Latin America that could pool the regions resources and genuinely challenge the
United States likely. The smaller Latin American states are as leery of Brazil as they are
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of the United States. As one Latin American diplomat recently remarked, “the new
imperialists have arrived, and they speak Portuguese.”170
Nevertheless, the economic growth of Latin America is vital because of its
implications for change on an institutional or structural level. For decades Latin
American countries have been at the mercy of the IMF, World Bank, and other
international organizations they had little control over. On a regional level the United
States has dominated the Organization of American States (OAS), often using it as a
means to coerce its weaker neighbors.171 This period is nearing its end. Brazil and other
Latin American countries are currently actively seeking greater voting rights in the IMF,
and Brazil has pursued a full seat on an expanded UN Security Council for decades.172
Furthermore, Brazil sponsors the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a
regional forum that excludes the United States and that some Latin American countries
hope could one day evolve into a genuine alternative to the OAS.173
If the United States wishes to avoid a push for systemic change in Latin America
it must acknowledge that it can no longer dominate the Western Hemisphere as it once
did. Systemic change has already occurred on the economic level, and the only way to
prevent it spilling over into the structural and eventually military spheres is to accept that
some interaction change in this area is both inevitable and beneficial, both to Latin
America and to the overall stability of the international system. The United States must
accept the new influence of the stronger Latin American countries and move towards a
more inclusive OAS to avoid pushing states into competing regional forums such as
170
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UNASUR. Furthermore, the United States should support the region’s push for more of a
say in the IMF, WTO, and World Bank, even if some quota gains for Latin America must
come at the expense of the voting power of the United States’ traditional allies in
Europe.174 Indeed the United State should go a step further, and actively support Brazil’s
bid for a seat on the UN Security Council. In addition to its primary benefit of pulling
Brazil further into the current international system, this has the potential to drive a wedge
between the BRIC states that already have a seat on the Security Council and those that
are actively seeking one.175
In short, the United States should do everything in its power to demonstrate that it
takes the economic and political rise of Latin America seriously, and that it is genuinely
committed to ensuring that the Latin American nations receive a fair representation in the
economic and, eventually, security institutions that are the hallmark of power in the
modern international system. If it can do so effectively it has the opportunity to convert a
potential source of insecurity into one of strength. If Latin America continues its
economic growth while further integrating into the international system it can become a
major source of stability, much as Western Europe has for the last sixty years.176 This
stability will come at the price of significant interaction change that will, at times,
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inconvenience the United States and its allies over the short term.177 Such inconveniences
are trivial, however, compared to the alternative.
If the United States resists change on all levels it risks uniting the states that
desire change into one coalition that, once it gains momentum, will not stop until it has
achieved systemic change and fundamentally altered the international system. China
recently displaced the United States as Brazil’s leading trading partner, and is heavily
invested in the wider region.178 Though this represents an economic interaction change it
is easy to envision scenarios in which these bonds harden into political and eventually
military alliances. The last time the United States faced a systemic challenge to its
hegemonic position during the Cold War it was strong enough (and Latin America was
weak enough) that it could rely on hard power to crush almost all resistance in the
Western Hemisphere.179 If the push for systemic change once again becomes great
enough, the United States may discover at the eleventh hour that this approach is no
longer sufficient.

Europe
The sustained “European peace” of the last seventy years has been one of the
greatest successes of the modern international system.180 From the end of the Second
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World War to the breakup of the Soviet Union western Europe has transformed itself
from a wasteland of ruined, squabbling states to a relatively unified whole. This union
has provided a continual source of stability, supporting international development
through IMF and World Bank loans, enforcing the norms of the international system
through institutions such as the International Criminal Court, and contributing to global
security through NATO participation and bilateral security agreements with the United
States.181 Throughout Europe there was wave of optimism after the Cold War ended that
this system could spread throughout the former Soviet Union, until all of Europe had
become one unified whole.182
Sadly, that dream has failed to materialize, and today a unified Europe free of
security concerns appears still far off. The revitalization of Russia, the failure of the
European Union to take unified action in response, the continued reliance of the
European states on American deterrence for their defense, and the recent Eurozone crisis
all point to a resurgence of change and conflict in Europe. Furthermore, declining
European birth rates, combined with a steady flow of immigrants and refugees from the
Middle East and North Africa has upset the ethnic balances of Europe, leading to
domestic upheaval as immigrants attempt to find a place in what were once more
homogeneous societies and a nationalist backlash from Europeans afraid of diluting their
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distinctive cultures.183 If Europe cannot weather this storm it risks returning to the
insecure battleground it took two world wars to crawl out of. Even if it finds a way
forward, demographic and economic trends suggest that overtime Europe will steadily
lose it ability to contribute to equilibrium and influence world affairs.
The most immediate threat facing Europe is the resurgence of Russia and its
aggressive challenge to the status quo. As has already been explored in the preceding
section, Russia’s military and economic strength is much reduced from what it could
muster during the Cold War, and it no longer has the means to directly compete with the
United States.184 Although this latent power differential matters, Russia does have several
key advantages over the west. Most critically, the United States can no longer afford to
give Russia its undivided attention. At the height of the Cold War the United States
maintained 450,000 troops in Western Europe; today it maintains only 64,000.185
Furthermore, the death of the ideological context of the Cold War has removed a major
component of America’s ties to Western Europe. Modern Europe is economically tied to
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Russia and largely dependent on it for its energy needs, making unified or unilateral
American action against Russia increasingly difficult.186
There are many explanations for the current conflict in Ukraine, and it remains
unclear whether Russia desires interaction change and wishes merely to return to its
historic great power role within the context of the current international system, or
whether it desires a systemic change and an end to American control over it. In some
respects, Russia’s ultimate motivations are irrelevant. By invading a sovereign state and
using military force to change national boundaries Russia has violated one of the
fundamental norms of the international system – that interstate violence is no longer an
acceptable means of achieving political ends.187 Whether intentionally or not, this move
has greatly increased disequilibrium in the international system by raising the question of
the credibility of the United States to enforce the rules of the system and signaling to the
world that violence is once again a possible means of achieving change – providing that
the aggressor is strong enough to confound an easy solution. It has also highlighted that,
for all its impressive economic strength, the European Union is not a state.188 It cannot
take unified military action, and as long as that remains the case European states must
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either continue to rely on the United States for their security or they must develop their
own independent capabilities, something which could itself greatly destabilize Europe.189
Even if the Russian threat were to disappear tomorrow, the problems besetting
Europe are significant. The Eurozone crisis has shattered the illusion that Europe’s
economic superiority can continue indefinitely. The sluggish recovery of Europe from the
Great Recession compared to India, China, and Brazil will lead to a further diffusion of
wealth from Europe to Asia and Latin America. This economic change will spill over into
other spheres, as the rising states convert their economic power into structural and
institutional pushes for change that will occur at the expense of Europe. This change is
unlikely to be preventable, given the decline in European birth rates and the difficulties
involved in revitalizing post-industrial economies.190
Although the preceding analysis paints a bleak picture for the future of Europe, it
is important to remember that relative decline is not necessarily negative. If Russia’s
resurgent nationalism is contained, if the Eurozone debt crisis is resolved, and if both are
achieved without prohibitive costs to Europe or the United States then Europe’s decline
could be slow and soft. Europe can continue to provide a stabilizing role in world affairs
much as it has for the last several decades, but this stability will come at a price.
European states will need to take on an increasing role in their own security as American
attention is focused elsewhere. European governments will have to accept that they are
going to lose some influence in institutions they have dominated since their inception.
Finally, the Europeans themselves will have to decide how to integrate immigrants of all
189
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ethnicities, religions, and cultures as they flock to a stable Europe in the face of an
increasingly unstable world.191 These costs will be difficult to bear, but the alternatives
are worse.
If the Eurozone debt crisis is not contained it could lead to a Greek exit from the
Eurozone, undermining the Euro and, potentially the entire concept of the European
Union.192 The death or diminishment of the financial union could greatly harm Europe’s
security situation, especially if it coincides with increased European defense spending
and/or a further drawdown of American forces in Europe. Combine this with an
aggressive Russia, energy insecurity, and resurgent nationalism as a response to
immigration and poor economic growth and the result could be a fractured Europe eerily
similar to its pre-1914 situation. For decades the world has taken great power peace in
Europe as a given, but this peace has been premised on American-supplied stability. As
that stability comes under pressure the United States will have to decide how much of its
resources it can continue to commit to maintaining Europe’s stability, and Europe will
have to demonstrate its willingness to contribute to stability in the international system,
or suffer the consequences of disequilibrium.
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Asia
If Latin America is slowly gaining wealth and influence while Europe flat lines or
slowly loses it, then Asia is growing stronger at an almost exponential rate.193 A recent
study on the future of American power argues that if the last several centuries have
revolved around the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the coming one will center on the
Pacific and Indian Ocean.194 The rise of India and China to great power status, the
presence of a third, offshore great power in the United States and a forth, potential great
power in Japan, the simultaneous rise of several other, influential, “middle powers” such
as Australia, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, and the continuing existence of
several “pariah” regimes in Burma and North Korea suggests that if Asia is going to
become the most wealthy region of the 21st century, it will also likely be the most
volatile.
The economic change that has occurred across Asia over the past twenty to thirty
years shows little sign of slowing down, let alone reversing. Thirty-six percent of the
world lives in either China or India, and these individuals will have a vital say in how the
world of tomorrow is shaped.195 As they become wealthier consumers they open up vast
new markets, fueling an almost limitless potential for growth. The economic competition
for these markets is already intense, as Japan, South Korea, China, and the United States
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compete for investment opportunities and trade agreements. The United States has
proposed a free-trade agreement in the form of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that
includes many East-Asian nations but pointedly excludes China.196 This free trade
agreement is an important component of America’s “pivot to Asia” as it would reaffirm
the image of the United States as a Pacific power and strengthen American ties to many
of the middle powers that could prove crucial balancers as China continues its rise.197
Alliances and economic ties matter because as the Asian nations have grown
richer they have begun to seek to convert this wealth into political influence and military
strength. On the military level this change has been relatively slow: in the entire region
only China has the potential to challenge the dominant position of the United States, and
even then it could only hope to win a defensive conflict close to its own shores.198 This
stability is subject to precipitous change, particularly if one or more of the region’s great
powers miscalculates. The rise of China has placed the United States in a precarious
situation. If the United States takes too aggressive a posture in resisting Chinese-led
change it risks leading to conflict between the two nations that could eventually turn
violent.199 If, on the other hand, the United States appears unwilling to maintain its
commitments in the Pacific the results could be arguably worse. Without a trustworthy
guarantee of American security commitments, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and
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Vietnam would all increase their military spending, potentially triggering a region-wide
arms race that could easily include nuclear proliferation.200 It’s not hard to imagine how
this arms race – once started – would be almost impossible to halt given the added
complexities of the historical relationships between the nations involved.
Adding to all this potential for change and conflict is the rise of a populous and
influential India that has not yet clearly articulated how it intends to wield its newfound
power.201 If India chooses to accommodate itself to the current international system it will
be a tremendous boost to the stability of the system. If India becomes an ally of the
United States then China might be truly contained, unable to mount a military challenge
that could overcome the current system by force or wield the economic or political
muscle necessary to create an system that provides a genuine alternative to the Americanled one.202 If, on the other hand, India decides that it desires genuine systemic change and
is willing to partner with China to achieve it the result will be catastrophic to the region
and the international system as a whole. During the Cold War China, India, and a
coalition of developing countries were able to resist the polarization caused by the
confrontation between two superpowers. Today, with their greatly improved capabilities
and expanding populations, the two nations could lead a coalition for change that would
be almost impossible to contain.
The United States, therefore, should have three overriding priorities in its pivot to
Asia. The first is to strengthen its relationship with India, deepening economic ties and,
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eventually, attempting to convert them into a genuine military alliance. Much of this
improved relationship must come at the expense of significant interaction change: at an
economic level through the inclusion of India in the TPP and other bilateral trade
agreements, on a military level as India improves its military capabilities – something
that will likely anger Pakistan, and on a structural level, as India seeks a greater say in
world economic forms and, eventually, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.203
These changes will be difficult but worthwhile if the United States is able to ally itself
with the world’s largest democracy. America’s second priority should be maintaining its
military deployments in Asia at a level that will prevent a regional arms race without
provoking China. Doing so will become increasingly more difficult and dangerous as
China’s capabilities grow, but it is absolutely vital to stabilize the region. Finally, the
United States should deepen its economic ties throughout the region, giving the American
economy a much-needed kick and countering some of China’s economic influence.
If the United States is able to do these three things then China will hopefully be
contained, and have no choice but to grow and expand within the confines of the current
international system. Even so, Asia is likely to become volatile in the near future and
remain so indefinitely. The vast economic changes that are currently occurring and the
presence of so many existing and potential great powers means that no matter what the
United States does interaction and systemic change will occur across all dimensions. The
imperative of the United States must be to adapt to these changes while preventing the
hegemonic war that has historically accompanied them.
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Africa and the Middle East
As Latin America and Asia continue their economic growth and Europe slowly
stagnates they have generated significant pressure for interaction and systemic change.
Africa and the Middle East, by contrast, are creating very little pressure for systemic
change. Neither region boosts a current or rising great power. South Africa is sometimes
considered a member of the BRICS, but its economy is stalling and its inefficient
government is unlikely to revitalize its economy or society anytime soon.204 In the
Middle East Saudi Arabia and Iran are both potential regional hegemons, but neither has
the strength to defeat the other, and both are held in check by the United States and
Israel.205 This is not to imply that Africa and the Middle East are irrelevant to the wider
world affairs – far from it. But the absence of a great power strong enough to push for
systemic changes of the international system does set these two regions apart from the
others studied here. Instead, the most pressing push for change originating in Africa and
the Middle East is not interactional or systemic, but systems change.
The great danger emanating from Africa and the Middle East are not the dangers
arising from rising states, but failed ones. In Nigeria the war against the Boko Haram
terrorist organization has failed to dislodge the group, which has recently won decisive
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victories against the Nigerian army and African Union (AU) troops in Cameroon.206 In
Somalia Al Shabaab – another Al-Qaeda affiliated group – has managed to hold off an
AU offensive led by Kenya.207 Finally, in war-torn Syria and Iraq The Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has carved out a vast swath of territory and proclaimed a new
Islamic Caliphate.208 These terrorist organizations are challenging the monopoly of the
use of force traditionally controlled by the state. They are using transnational financing
networks and recruitment to fight weak and failed states, and in doing so they are creating
a subtle pressure for systems change of the international system. Despite the local
depredations of these organizations, this pressure is unlikely to lead to major systems
change in the foreseeable future. The nation-state system remains dominant, even in most
of Africa and the Middle East, and short of a catastrophic man-made or natural disaster in
the region that seems unlikely to change. Nevertheless, these organizations – and others
like them throughout the world – significantly contribute to global disequilibrium.209
The challenges facing the United States in the Middle East and Africa are
significant. It must partner with local actors to combat the sources of systems change
across the region. It must act to prevent an arms race in the Middle East between Saudi
Arabia and Iran, maintain the security of regional shipping lanes and the vital flow of oil,
and prevent the spread of potential pandemics when local governments are unable to
effectively act. Finally, it must act as a buffer between Israel and the Arab world. All of
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these efforts consume American resources that could otherwise be productively invested
or used to respond to the rise of the new great powers.
The implications of all this is that although Africa and the Middle East lack a
rising power or (as long as Iran is prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons) a regional
hegemon, it will continue to contribute to disequilibrium. America’s inability to withdraw
from the Middle East demonstrates the necessity of maintaining stability in the region for
global trade and security. It is vital to insure that the United States does not pay the entire
costs of maintaining this stability alone. The challenges facing Africa and the Middle
East cannot be solved by any one power, and the regions are an important opportunity for
the worlds great and middle powers – existing and rising – to work together with regional
actors to combat extremism and drug trafficking, prevent pandemics, and create new
development opportunities. This international cooperation is necessary and desirable; no
current state – rising or otherwise – benefits from systems change, and it is, therefore, in
the interests of all nations to work together to provide stability in Africa and the Middle
East.

Conclusion
Major economic change has fundamentally shifted the balance of power in several
key regions around the world. In most cases, this economic change has coincided with
attempts at structural and (less frequently) military change, placing new constraints on
American action in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The United States should adapt to
these shifts by accepting and supporting change that does not negatively impact the
overall stability of the system or the key interests of the United States, while resisting
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change damaging to the international order. The United States must understand that as
Europe declines in economic influence relative to rising powers in Asia and Latin
America it must also decline in political and military significance. This suggests that the
United States – while not abandoning its European commitments – must also seek out
new partners to help share the costs of system maintenance. If the United States can
convert Brazil and India into status quo powers (at least on a systemic level) while
maintaining the support of western Europe and influential middle powers in Asia such as
Japan and South Korea, it can distribute the costs of maintaining the status quo much as
Great Britain did vis-à-vis the United States in the first half of the 20th century. This will
compel Russia, China, and future rising power to integrate into an international system
strong enough to resist disequilibrium. Finally, the United States must seek the help of
these rising powers in combating extremism and the broader dangers associated with
weak and failed states in Africa and the Middle East.
Achieving all this will be difficult on many levels, as it requires a fundamental
rethinking of the American approach to international relations. The United States must
accept that the international order is rapidly becoming less unipolar, but that the United
States still fulfills a vital role in its stability. Responding to these two seemingly
contradictory realities will require difficult decisions and sacrifices. Until the rising great
powers fully integrate into the international system the United States must continue
paying the costs of a unipolar power while wielding the influence of a multipolar power.
The alternative is to risk alienating the same powers that will soon become essential
partners in maintaining stability. Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether the United
States can muster the political will to accept change without creating conflict.
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V A Lackluster Response
Introduction
A US National Security Brief released in February of 2015 was unique in
explicitly stating that the United States continues to have a decisive influence in the
international order.210 In a section on “International Order” the document makes it clear
that the United States “has an opportunity—and obligation—to lead the way in
reinforcing, shaping, and where appropriate, creating the rules, norms, and institutions
that are the foundation for peace, security, prosperity and the protection of human rights
in the 21st century.”211 This explicit acknowledgment of the American role in systems
maintenance is unusual in a national security document, which generally deal with more
immediate threats to American security interests.212 The Strategy lays out five keys steps
to what amounts to continued American leadership around the globe: “Advancing our
Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific,” “Strengthening Our Enduring Alliance with Europe,”
“Seek Stability and Peace in the Middle East and North Africa,” “Invest in Africa’s
Future,” and “Deepen Economic and Security Cooperation in the Americas.”213
These slogans are well and good, but in the section that follows I analyze how the
United States’ deeds in each of the four regions studied above match American rhetoric
and the realities of the situations. My intent is to explore what capacity the United States
truly has to maintain stability in the international system, and judge how affective a job it
has done so far. To do so I first study the raw economic, political, and structural capacity
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of the United States to maintain stability in the face of rising challengers. I then examine
how the United States has chosen to wield its unique power, and predict whether or not it
can continue to do so in a sustainable manner over the next several decades.

Exaggerated Economic Decline
The 2008 financial collapse exposed some fundamental weaknesses in the
American economy. Financial deregulation, low interest rates, and high levels of liquidity
caused by what former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernake called the “global savings
glut” all contributed to the worst financial meltdown since the great depression.214
Although the United States and its European allies are slowly recovering from the crash,
their recovery looks weak when compared to the continued seven to eight percent growth
of the Chinese economy.215 It’s tempting to label these economic problems aspects of
imperial overstretch, but this oversimplifies the issues facing the American economy. The
United States faces new economic competition and suffers from several structural
weaknesses that harm its growth rate relative to countries like China, but many of these
issues do not arise from America’s position as the hegemon of the international system.
Kennedy argues that the two great tests confronting the United States are
“whether, in the military/strategic realm, it can preserve a reasonable balance between the
nation’s perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those
commitments; and whether, as an immediately related point, it can preserve the
technological and economic bases of its power.”216 To a large extent the United States
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has thus far done so. In fiscal year 2013 the United States spent twenty-one percent of its
budget on Defense.217 By comparison, Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security
combined made up 47.9 percent of the budget.218 This is by far the highest military
budget by percentage of GDP: Russia currently spends roughly 17 percent of its total
budget on defense and China spends around 6.2 percent on its military, although that
figure has been substantially rising in recent years.219 Thus while the US budget is
substantially larger than any potential challenger is it not as oversized as commonly
imagined when compared to the total United States budget. The budget deficit is the
largest it has been since the end of the Second World War, and it does represent a
significant threat to the long-term ability of the United States to maintain control of the
international system, but it is not caused by imperial overstretch. Whether or not it is a
solvable problem depends on the willingness of the rising powers to share the costs
associated with system maintenance and the ability of American politicians to find longterm solutions to the rising costs of social security and health care.
Worsening this situation for the United States are two structural economic
problems that may adversely affect its ability to maintain equilibrium in the international
system. The first of these is that the United States has primarily transitioned to a service
economy, and service economies have traditionally shown lower rates of growth than
manufacturing economies (such as China’s).220 Furthermore, domestic consumption in
the United States far outweighs the equivalent in developing countries, and consumes
resources that could otherwise be put into productive investments or system
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maintenance.221 Both of these weaknesses have afflicted historical hegemons, but the
United States maintains one unique strength that previous great powers have not. The
United States is consistently revitalized by fresh waves of immigrants, who in their
hunger to succeed help avert what Gilpin terms “the corrupting influence of affluence.”222
These immigrants earn 40 percent of the doctorates in science and engineering, and 65
percent of doctorates in computer science. Half of all Silicon Valley start-ups have at
least one founder who is an immigrant or first generation American.223 These new
Americans are vital to the continued strength of the American nanotechnology,
biotechnology, and software industries. As long as the United States maintains its
relatively open immigration policies it can help mitigate some of the structural challenges
intrinsic to a mature economy.

A Greatly Misused Power
The economic supremacy of the United States is slowly drawing to a close, and as
the preceding two sections have explored, so is its control over the great power system.
Despite this, the United States retains a decisive advantage over nearly all aspects of hard
power, including economic might, geographic position, and military strength. The United
States spends more on defense research and development than the rest of the world
combined, multiplying its already great advantages over a potential military challenger.224
This spending has not bankrupted the United States; total defense spending is currently
around 4 percent of GDP, comparatively less than the British equivalent at the height of
221
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its power in the mid 19th century.225 The economic potential of the United States has
taken a hit in recent years, but there is no reason to believe that the United States will
experience imperial overstretch in the near-to midterm future.
In the soft power arena, the United States faces competitors for the first time in
decades, but there are still no states that pose a genuine alternative to American
leadership. There might be a broad international consensus that the United States has
sometimes overplayed its hand, yet every time an international crisis develops, it is
assumed that the United States will be there to step in, whether the Balkan crises in the
90s or a minor border skirmish between Morocco and Spain in 2002.226 The reputation of
the United States has been recently tarnished, yet a majority of the citizens in almost two
thirds of the world’s nations have a favorable view of the United States.227 Of the four
BRIC states, Russia is the only one in which a majority of its citizens have an
unfavorable view of America.228 Nor has support for the United States fallen off among
its traditional allies. In the last six years the number of individuals with a favorable view
of the United States increased 12 percent in South Korea, 13 percent in the UK, 16
percent in Japan, 20 percent in Germany, and 33 percent in France.229 External wars such
as Iraq and Afghanistan and domestic issues such as the Ferguson protests and Senate
torture report damage American standing in the world, but there is little evidence to

225

Ibid., 182 and Kennedy: 1987, 176.
Zakaria: 2008, 215. The crisis in question (the Parsley crisis over an uninhabited island in the
strait of Gibraltar), was mediated by then Secretary of State Colin Powell after the EU, UN, and
France failed to broker an agreement.
227
Pew Research Center: 2014.
228
Ibid. Only 23 percent of Russians currently have a favorable view of the United States,
compared to 50 percent in China, 55 percent in India, and 65 percent in Brazil.
229
Ibid. As of 2014, 82 percent of South Koreans, 66 percent of Britons and Japanese, 51 percent
of Germans, and 75 percent of the French have a favorable view of the United States.
226

78

believe that the majority of foreign nationals see a real alternative to American hegemony
in the near future.
This structural power of the United States is largely invisible, but is an essential
component of continued American control over the international system. It manifests
itself in the continued vitality of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, the goodwill
the United States gains by providing the public goods of open trade and an (at times
imperfect) guarantee of national sovereignty, and the large amount of influence wielded
by the United States in the world’s two most influential international institutions, the IMF
and the UN Security Counsel. American structural power is also apparent in the vast
alliance systems the United States leads. Three-quarters of the world’s forty wealthiest
states are US allies. By comparison only one (Thailand) is a Chinese ally.230 The
structural power of the United States helps maintain equilibrium in the international
system because it makes it difficult for potential challengers to appear legitimate. Perhaps
the most pertinent sign of this is that only half of the Chinese believe that China will one
day replace the United States as the world’s superpower.231
Despite all this, the United States has done a seemingly poor job of system
maintenance over the past two decades. In Europe the norms of territorial integrity are
being threatened by a revisionist Russia to which Washington has yet to articulate a
convincing deterrent.232 In Asia the rise of China has already sparked concerns of a newly
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militarized Japan adding to the region’s existing instability.233 The United States has yet
to demonstrate a clear vision of how Brazil and the rest of a rising Latin America will fit
into an expanding world order, and while it hesitates the region searches for alternatives
to a system it sees as unbalanced.234 Finally, in the Middle East decades of American
mismanagement –most recently its failure to pacify Iraq – have led to unrest, civil war,
and a growing Sunni extremist threat throughout a region where parts of Libya, Syria,
Yemen, and Iraq remain failed states that continues to export violence alongside critically
vital oil and gas.
While some of these failures were beyond the ability of the United States to
predict, the magnitude of challenges facing the international order was not inevitable. The
primary disconnect that has caused much of the challenges against the continued
American leadership of the international system have been caused by a fundamental
misreading of the global order. Too often, American leaders have acted as though the
favorable conditions of the 90s – unchallenged American economic superiority and a
complete lack of alternative “polls” – remained true today. As the preceding analysis has
suggested, these conditions have not existed for some time, and the United States must
now adjust to operate in a world where there are many competing interests that must be
acknowledged. The United States can continue to lead, but it can no longer act
unilaterally.
The situation in Iraq is an example of the failure of unilateral action. The initial
invasion went against the interests of many of the United States European allies as well
as the wishes of the Chinese and Russians. It angered Iran and prompted it to respond
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with support to various terrorist networks throughout Iraq and the Middle East.
Furthermore, although the United States was able to use its military superiority to easily
crush the regime of Saddam Hussein, it was unable to build a sustainable democratic
government in its wake, giving rise to lawlessness and the takeover of much of the
countryside by the Islamic State. All of this has so far cost the United States more than
two trillion dollars and more almost four and a half thousand dead soldiers, while further
destabilizing the region.235 Crucially, it has pulled American resources away from where
they are really needed, in Asia – to balance the rise of China, and in Europe, to balance
the resurgence of Russia. Although the eventual impact of the Iraq War is uncertain it is
difficult to foresee how complete stability could be restored without a second occupation,
something that currently appears politically untenable.236
The Ukrainian Crisis is another situation that demonstrates how the United States
has misused its global position of leadership. The Russian occupation of Crimea and its
ongoing support for rebels in eastern Ukraine has been internationally condemned, and
even China has been critical of Russian actions in the region.237 Despite this consensus,
the United States has found it difficult to organize a sanctions regime against Putin’s
actions. Instead every American move has been met by bickering on the part of
Europeans who are afraid that by angering Russia they might trigger a new Cold War that
would threaten their trade relations and supplies of oil and gas.238 The United States has
failed to provide a credible solution to this dilemma or a credible deterrent to Russia’s
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actions. This is not to say that there is a silver bullet to the Ukrainian Crisis – or any
international conflict currently involving the United States.239 These are difficult issues
that demand well thought out responses, but too often the United States has allowed
short-term crises to distract from longer-term interests.

A New Way Forward
Taking a long-term view requires the United States to act strategically, not
respond to events as they occur. Too often American actions are driven by short-term
public opinion, not long-term strategic thinking. Obama’s decision to withdraw from Iraq
fulfilled a campaign promise and was wildly popular domestically, but the resulting
power vacuum resulted in the Islamic State seizing hundreds of miles of territory
throughout Iraq and destroyed the Maliki government. This collapse was predictable; up
to a year before the last US combat troops left Iraq experts were predicting that a sudden
American pullout would be disastrous for regional stability.240 Despite this, the United
States did withdraw and the result has been continued instability and a constant drain on
American resources.241
If the United States is to avoid similar situations in the future it must pursue more
long-term strategies, and it must abandon ideological constraints to action. In the case of
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Iraq this involves partnering with Iran, which has a key stake in the future of Iraq and is a
natural partner against the Sunni Islamic State.242 Although official alliances are off the
table for historical reasons, there are signs that the United States is already quietly
partnering with Iran, and Haider al-Abadi – Iraq’s new Prime Minister – appears to enjoy
Iranian support, a vital component of his continued legitimacy.243 It’s possible that the
United States is considering doing so in Syria as well, partnering with President Assad to
defeat the Islamic State in its home territories.244 The United States must be willing to do
more of this in the future, working with former rivals and enemies as it responds to new
threats to international stability.
There is historical precedent for this action. By the mid 1800s Great Britain had
fought two wars with the United States, and during the American Civil War it covertly
supported the Rebels in an attempt to weaken the United States. Yet by the late 19th
century the Royal Navy was enforcing the Monroe Doctrine and upholding American
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.245 This support, and the trade it encouraged,
bound the United States to Great Britain, converting it from an adversary to a partner in
maintaining international stability against the revisionist powers of Germany, Italy, and
Japan. It’s not difficult to imagine how the First World War could have ended differently
if the United States decided that its interests were advanced more by a German victory
than continued British hegemony.

242

In particular see Barzegar: 2015.
Almaliky: 2015.
244
Simon: 2014.
245
Perhaps most importantly, Great Britain supported the United States over Spain in the Spanish
American War and did not respond to the subsequent buildup of a competitive blue-water navy.
243

83

The United States should accept the lessons of history and be willing to convert
yesterday’s foes to tomorrow’s partners. This is as true in Asia, Latin America, and
Europe as it is of the Middle East. In Asia the United States can work closer with former
allies and adversaries such as Vietnam and other ASEAN members to constrain the rise
of China.246 These smaller states are most directly threatened by a more assertive China,
and partnering with them can signal to China that while the United States welcomes its
rise, it will not tolerate violations of the norms of national sovereignty and selfdetermination. In Latin America the United States should continue to extend an olive
branch to Cuba and other countries that have traditionally opposed American intervention
in the region. Doing so could prevent these countries from turning to Brazil as a genuine
alternative to American leadership and remove barriers to greater American engagement
in Latin America.247 Finally, in Europe the United States should make explicit its security
guarantees to former Soviet States such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. These
countries are already NATO members, but if Russia misinterprets the American
commitment to defending them it could lead to a conflict between the two great powers
that would prove almost impossible to control. The best way to prevent such a conflict is
to demonstrate the American commitment to NATO with a greater military presence in
the region.248 If Russia does not believe it can quickly win a military confrontation with
one of these small states it is less likely to force a crisis than it would be otherwise.
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The United States has already made some adaptations to suit the changing
geostrategic situation, most noticeable in Europe and Asia. In Europe the United States
has is actively seeking greater economic ties to Europe through the introduction of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a free-trade agreement that is
optimistically predicted to create between .5 and 2 percent GDP growth on both sides of
the Atlantic along with 2 million new jobs.249 It also has the potential to ease Europe’s
reliance on Russia for its energy needs and unify Europe and the United States. America
has also responded to Russian aggression through the creation of a brigade-sized NATO
quick response force that would be capable of deploying to an eastern European country
within days of a crisis.250
These actions are laudatory, but the United States must balance maintaining the
status quo in Europe without distracting from its ongoing commitments in the Middle
East and North Africa, derailing its rebalance to Asia, or preventing it from widening its
investments in Latin America. The current proposed composition of the brigade is a
welcome sign, the troops will be exclusively German, Dutch, and Norwegian.251 The
manner in which the costs of maintaining the brigade will be distributed throughout
NATO has not been settled though. The United States must ensure that it does not allow
European matters to obscure the larger strategic picture and that the costs of system
maintenance are shared by its allied great powers.
The United States has also made promising strides in Asia. President Obama has
made improving relations with India a priority through a high profile visit to New Delhi,
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and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has the potential to increase America’s economic
clout in East Asia.252 American-led multilateral naval operations in the straits of Malacca
and off the Horn of Africa have served to deter piracy and demonstrate the United States
control over the Indian Ocean’s shipping lanes, but it is unclear whether these actions
have been enough to fully reassure Japan and South Korea that the United States remains
the preeminent Pacific power.253 The US Navy has not yet articulated a coherent reply to
threats posed by Chinese ASBM and littoral assets such as surface warships, missile
boats, and submarines. The United States should not provoke confrontation or seek to
threaten Chinese assets, but it must maintain a viable deterrent throughout East Asia. If
China does act provocatively, the United States must be willing to take any and all steps
necessary to contain it, including using military force to defend American allies and close
the strait of Malacca.
This renewed commitment to the Pacific must include outreach to Latin America
as well as Asia. The United States has already invited Mexico, Peru, and Chile to join the
TPP negotiations, and should consider an additional Latin America free trade agreement
that could serve to weaken the region’s growing economic ties to China.254 The United
States should also rethink its approach to regional institutions such as the OAS, and
accept that allowing smaller Latin American States more of a say will be necessary to
prevent a rebellion against American influence in the region.255 At the same time, the
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United States must demonstrate that it retains the capacity – economically, militarily, and
politically – to lead in the Western Hemisphere.
Avoiding the appearance of dominance is not the same as abandoning a position
of leadership, and the United States must continue working through regional institutions
to solve transnational problems such as drug trafficking, boarder disputes, and the effects
of climate change.256 Thawing American relations with Cuba are an encouraging sign that
the United States may be slowly abandoning its ideologically rigid approach to Latin
America, but even this small step could be reversed by a congress that shows no sign of
softening its tone towards the region.257 The United States must convince Latin America
that it is genuinely committed to change and accepts that it is no longer the overbearing
hegemon of the western hemisphere.

Conclusion
The United States has taken some actions to respond to change in the international
system that have improved its ability to resist disequilibrium in the international system,
but the country needs to do much more. The United States continues to possess a vibrant
economy that will allow it to continue paying the costs of system maintenance for the
foreseeable future, but it can no longer act as the world’s only superpower. The rise of the
new great powers of India Brazil, and China has altered the balance of power in Asia and
the western hemisphere, and the resurgent nationalism of Russia has threatened the
stability of Europe. The United States has been slow to respond to these changes, an
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inevitable result of institutional inertia that is nevertheless no longer sustainable. The
United States must accommodate change when it can, and use tough rhetoric and prompt
action when it must. If the United States continues in its unilateral manner it will alienate
potential allies and increase the costs of maintain the status quo, but if it acts indecisively
it raises the potential for miscalculation and conflict.
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VI Conclusion: Change and Conflict
The world is shifting inexorably, and as economic potential is redistributed to
Asia and Latin America pressure for consummate political and structural change will
increase. The rise of the new great powers of India, Brazil, and China will usher in an era
of increasing disequilibrium and instability throughout the international system as they
press for greater control over their own destinies. Historically, disequilibrium in the
international system has been resolved through violent hegemonic conflict between the
new and status quo powers. The most recent examples of hegemonic war – the two world
wars of the 20th century – cost over 100 million combined fatalities and resulted in a
fundamental reordering of the international system.258 This study is, at heart, a search for
an escape from that fate.
The existing theories on change in the international system – most prominently
Kennedy’s theory of imperial overstretch and Gilpin’s related thesis – suggest that the
costs of system maintenance inevitably come to outweigh the ability of the leading
hegemon to pay, resulting in younger great powers initiating systemic change.259
Although the historical analysis conducted by these two scholars suggests that major
change and conflict have been synonymous in the international system, their predictions
of the imminent decline of the United States and its replacement by either Russia (Gilpin)
or Japan (Kennedy) have thus far been inaccurate. The United States remains the world’s
most powerful military, economic, and structural power, and though it has lost ground
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over the past two decades to rising powers, there is as of now no power with the
resources or will to replace the United States as the world’s hegemon.260
Despite the continued lack of a peer competitor, the United States is slowly losing
its economic, political and military dominance as India, China, and Brazil rise. This
relative decline does not necessarily imply the end of American leadership, but it does
require a shift in how Washington views and acts towards the rest of the world. The
United States is more constrained than at any time since the end of the Cold War, and in
some places it faces stiffer competition. China, Brazil, India, and the European Union are
in a far better position to compete with the United States economically than the Soviet
Union ever was, and this competition has harmed the ability of the United States to
maintain the status quo.261 America already pays the heavy costs of systems maintenance,
including its ongoing commitments in the Middle East, its spending on the world’s only
expeditionary-capable blue water navy, its payments that support international
institutions such as the World Bank IMF, and the UN, and its deployments of soldiers in
bases around the world. These costs will only increase as the rising powers increase there
relative share of world wealth and translate some of it to larger military forces and a push
for greater institutional representation. Therefore although the United States is not yet
overextended it soon could be short of a major drawdown of American presence overseas
or an increase in burden sharing among all the great powers.
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If this overstretch occurs – or, just as importantly, appears to occur – it will give
the rising powers an opportunity to attempt to overturn the international system and
create a new order that better suits their interests.262 At best this will lead to a period of
profound instability as nations lose faith in existing institutions and norms but are unable
to find viable alternatives. A similar situation gripped Europe at the turn of the 19th
century, as the old balance of power faded and no new powers stepped into the vacuum.
At worst, disequilibrium will lead to great power war, either as United States uses force
to attempt to prevent systemic change or as a rising power uses force to achieve it. In
either case there will be serious disruptions to development, international trade, and
global security as states compete in an increasingly anarchic environment.
These disruptions are not inevitable, but preventing disequilibrium will require a
readjustment by the status quo powers and restraint on the part of the rising powers. The
United States must accept interaction change throughout the international system,
including a redistribution of representation and influence in international organizations
such as the UN and IMF and a diffusion of military power to the rising powers.263 The
rising powers must also demonstrate restraint, accepting that gradual change is a
necessary alternative to disequilibrium, resisting the impulse to engage in arms-races that
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have historically accompanied systemic change, and accepting that not all of their desired
reforms of the existing system will be implemented.264
If both status quo and rising powers do exercise restraint, then the changes to the
international system could ultimately prove beneficial, both to global living standards and
international stability. The United States would gain new support in maintaining the
current system, reducing the potential for imperial overstretch and increasing the
resources it has available for continued technological development and the promotion of
global trade and development. The rising powers would gain many of the trappings of
great power status they desire while continuing to grow in a stable international
environment largely maintained with United States leadership. The rest of the world too
would benefit from the peaceful rise of new great powers, which already make vital
contributions to international development and disaster relief funds.265 The new great
powers also have the potential to become partners with the United States on international
issues such as climate change, transnational terrorism, and international crime.266 These
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joint ventures could build trust and cooperation between the great powers while fighting
some of the most pressing systems challenges.
It is possible that the rising great powers will integrate into the international
system, prompting change without significant conflict and avoiding the Thucydides’
Trap, but that path is far from certain. The most recent US National Security Strategy
concludes that, “we confidently welcome the peaceful rise of other countries as partners
to share the burdens for maintaining a more peaceful and prosperous world.”267 This
indicates an understanding on the part of the current administration that the world order is
shifting, and that the United States must shift with it. Unfortunately, while words are
important, deeds are what will ultimately determine the pace and character of change in
the international system. It is one thing to state in a document that the United States
welcomes the rise of other countries, it is another to take the political steps necessary to
ensure that this rise is indeed peaceful.
The United States must separate its short-term national interests and its longerterm investment in the stability of the international system, and understand that an
uncompromising commitment to the former risks undermining the latter. Ultimately,
that’s a difficult path to walk in the face of short-term electoral politics and the diverse
interests of important interest groups hostile to any act that appears a concession. There is
precedent, though, in the manner in which Great Britain accommodated the United
States. It traded influence, economic interests, and ultimately, strategic power in the
western hemisphere in return for peace and an eventual alliance with the United States. A
redistribution of power in the international system is possible without conflict between
267
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the rising and falling power, but it requires visionary leadership and an educated public
willing to accept that change is inevitable but conflict is not.
The systemic change that gave rise to the current international order has an
additional, less hopeful lesson. Great Britain was willing to accept the rise of the United
States and the diminishment of its influence in the western hemisphere, but it could not
accept the ideologically and revisionist driven rise of Germany and Japan. Nor could
Russia, Japan, and Germany cooperate as they simultaneously rose to new power and
prominence. Conciliatory American attitudes will matter little if the rising powers seek to
change the international system in ways that are antithetical to the existing norms and
institutions or are unable to cooperate with each other. Russia’s violation of national
sovereignty in Ukraine and Georgia is an example of such behavior, and China’s ongoing
border disputes with many of its neighbors (including India) raises the potential for
conflict, not cooperation. If these two powers continue to challenge stability in this
manner the result will be disequilibrium, whether the United States is willing to cooperate
or not.
Thus the United States must walk a fine line in the coming decades, accepting
incremental change not fundamentally damaging to the stability of the international
system while demonstrating that it retains the capacity to meet violations of the
international order with overwhelming force. This task will grow ever greater as the
BRIC states continue to rise, increasing the costs of acceptable change to the status-quo
states and lessening the ability of the United States to effectively respond to change it
cannot accept without overcommitting its relatively reduced resources. Nevertheless, it is

94

possible for the United States to successfully stave off disequilibrium, providing the
rising powers can be satisfied with incremental change.
The Shree Kodari School in Nepal is a symbol for the potential benefits and
dangers of change in the international system. The competition between India and China
for influence over Nepal has had an important positive influence on Nepal’s
development, resulting in new schools, dams, roads, and loans. These aid packages have
been crucial in a region that is frequently ignored by Washington and relies on
international assistance to provide for its people. This could be the new future, where
great powers compete in an attempt to outdo one another in assistance to developing
countries they seek to bring within their spheres of influence. Unfortunately though, there
is another reason for India and China’s competition over Nepal’s affections.
As the only unfortified boarder between the two rising powers, Nepal represents
the ultimate high ground, territory which will become vital if India and China ever again
engage in violent conflict. This is the future the United States and the rest of the world
must work to avoid. Change and conflict need not be synonymous in the international
system, but escaping Thucydides’ Trap will require a sustained effort on the part of world
leaders that has seldom before been attempted. The path ahead is difficult and dangerous,
full of sacrifice, and all but impossible to predict, but the only alternative to forward
progress is to fall.
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